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I. INTRODUCTION
Offers and sales of securities generally are subject to the regis-
tration requirements of the Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act or
the 1933 Act),I These provisions mandate comprehensive disclosures
regarding the offering, the issuer and related matters. 2 Furthermore,
to encourage accuracy and completeness of disclosure, the Securities
Act imposes stringent obligations and liabilities upon a broad range
of parties to the transaction. 3
* B.A., University of Houston, 1964; LL.B., Harvard Law School, '1967; Assistant
Professor of Law, Creighton University. This article was prepared as a result of a project
funded by Kutak Rock Cohen Campbell Garfinkle & Woodward, Omaha, Nebraska. The
author expresses his appreciation to W. Patrick Betterman for research assistance.
15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1970).
2 E.g., Securities Act §§ 5-7, 10, Schedule A, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77e-77g, 77j, 77aa (1970).
3 Securities Act § 11, 15 U.S.C. '§ 77k (1970), provides in pertinent part:
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Nevertheless, in certain situations, it has been deemed unneces-
sary or undesirable to impose the expensive and time consuming
requirements of the statutory scheme. Among these situations are
intrastate and private offerings. 5 These are "transactional" exemp-
tions6 which are frequently relied upon, particularly by promotional
companies or in small offerings.? Since these are only "transaction-
al" exemptions, the registration requirements may apply, on other
(a) In case any part of the registration statement, when such part became
effective, contained an untrue statement of a material fact or omitted to state a
material fact required to be stated therein or necessary to make the statements
therein not misleading, any person acquiring such security (unless it is proved that at
the time of such acquisition he knew of such untruth or omission) may, either at law
or in equity, in any court of competent jurisdiction, sue—
(1) every person who signed the registration statement;
(2) every person who was a director of (or person performing similar functions)
or partner in the issuer at the time of the filing of the part of the registration
statement with respect to which his liability is asserted;
(3) every person who, with his consent, is named in the registration statement
as being or about to become a director, person performing similar functions, or
partner;
(4) every accountant, engineer, or appraiser, or any person whose profession
gives authority to a statement made by him, who has with his consent been
named as having prepared or certified any part of the registration statement, or
as having prepared or certified any report or valuation which is used in connec-
tion with the registration statement, with respect to the statement in such
registration statement, report, or valuation, which purports to have been pre-
pared or certified by him;
(5) every underwriter with respect to such security. .
(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a) of this section no person,
other than the issuer, shall be liable as provided therein who shall sustain the burden
of proof—. .
(3) that (A) as regards any part of the registration statement not purporting to
be made on the authority of an expert, and not purporting to be a copy of or
extract from a report or valuation of an expert, and not purporting to be made
on the authority of a public official document or statement, he had, after
reasonable investigation, reasonable ground to believe and did believe, at the
time such part of the registration statement became effective, that the statements
therein were true and that there was no omission to state a material fact
required to be stated therein or necessary to make the statements therein not
misleading . . . .
(c) In determining, for the purpose of paragraph (3) of subsection (b) of this
section, what constitutes reasonable investigation and reasonable ground for belief,
the standard of reasonableness shall be that required of a prudent man in the
management of his own property. . . . (Emphasis added.]
See Securities Act § 12(2), 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1970). Actions under §§ 11 and 12(2) are subject
to a particularly short statute of limitations. Securities Act § 13, 15 U.S.C. § 77m (1970).
4 Securities Act § 3(a)(11), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(11) (1970).
Securities Act § 4(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1970).
n SEC SeCurities Act Release No. 4434, reprinted in 1 CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 11 2270, at
2607 (Dec. 6, 1961); Securities Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 77d (1970). See note 18 infra.
7
 See SEC Securities Act Release No. 4434, reprinted in 1 CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
11 2270, at 2607 (Dec. 6, 1961); SEC Securities Act Release No. 5450, reprinted in I CCH Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. 11 2340, at 2611 (Ian. 7, 1974); SEC Rule 146, 39 Fed. Reg. 15266 (1974); SEC
Rule 147, 17 C.F.R. § 230.147 (1974).
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occasions, to offerings and sales of the same securities which are not
required to be registered in an exempt offering. 8
In private offerings, a fairly small number of relatively sophis-
ticated purchasers is involved. 9
 These purchasers possess the lever-
age or other means to obtain and verify a considerable amount of
information concerning the issuer." In intrastate offerings, which
may involve a large number of unsophisticated purchasers, regula-
tion by state agencies frequently provides a degree of protection for
investors. This may take the form of registration requirements,''
antifraud provisions, 12
 or even substantive regulation of the terms
of the offering.' 3 Limited additional general information may be
available since an intrastate offering involves an issuer and investors
in the same broadly defined "locality.""
Additionally, other exemptions are available, frequently based
at least in part, upon similar considerations involving alternative
sources of investor protection. Some of these exemptions apply to
most securities issued by insurance companies subject to state regu-
lation," certain securities issued by common carriers regulated by
the Interstate Commerce Commission," and certain securities of
those banks subject to supervision by federal or state regulatory
authorities. 17
 In these cases, the securities are never subject to the
registration requirements regardless of the character of the transac-
tion. 18
 Consequently, they are considered "securities" exemptions.
Another "securities" exemption is provided for securities issued by
state and local governmental bodies.' 9
 In contrast to the regulation
of transactions in securities covered by many of the other exemptive
See SEC Securities Act Release No. 5450, reprinted in 1 CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
¶ 2340, at 2611 (Jan, 7, 1974); SEC Rule 144, 17 C.F.R. § 230.144 (1974).
9
 See SEC Rule 146, 39 Fed, Reg. 15266 (1974).
1° See id.
'' See Uniform Securities Act §§ 301-06.
12 Id. § 101.
' 3
 See, e.g., Iowa Code Ann. § 502.10(5) (1971) (permitting denial of registration based
on the reputation or business condition of the issuer).
14
 See SEC Securities Act Release No. 5450, reprinted in 1 CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
¶ 2340, at 2611 (Jan. 7, 1974); SEC Securities Act Release No. 4434, reprinted in 1 CCH Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. 11 2270, at 2580 (Dec. 6, 1961),
15 Securities Act § 3(a)(8), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(8) (1970).
16 Securities Act § 3(a)(6), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(6) (1970).
17
 Securities Act § 3(a)(5), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(5) (1970).
1 " See Securities Act § 3(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a) (1970), which provides in pertinent part:
"Except as hereinafter expressly provided, the provisions of this title shall not apply to any of
the following classes of securities . . . ." This exemption is not as broad as it appears. For
instance, SEC Securities Act Release No. 4434, reprinted in 1 CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ¶ 2270,
at 2580 (Dec. 6, 1961), states that certain "exempted securities" under § 3(a)(11) may require
registration, although issued in an intrastate offering, if found to be part of a larger "issue."
Id. at 2581. As to these, § 3(a) is, therefore, a transactional exemption.
Securities Act § 3(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(aX2) (1970).
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provisions, there are no supervisory bodies to ensure that standards
of disclosure are enforced for the protection of investors in securities
issued by state and local governments. Nevertheless, few defaults
occur on the bonds issued by governmental bodies under this
exemption. 2 ° There are practical investor protections present in
these offerings, for even though offerings of governmental securities
are often underwritten, the purchasers of these securities have
tended to be sophisticated and small in number," and frequently
are institutions or individuals from the same "locality" as the issuing
governmental body.
One type of governmental security which has been issued with
increasing frequency in recent years is the "industrial development
bond." An industrial development bond offering involves an is-
suance of securities by a governmental body to provide funds for the
acquisition or construction of facilities to be leased or purchased
from the governmental body by a specific private enterprise. The
amount involved in such an offering may be quite large. The im-
petus for the offering is provided by the private enterprise, and the
governmental body participates as an accommodation. This ar-
rangement provides tax benefits 22 to the investors, so that the gov-
ernment can pay interest on the bonds lower than is paid on com-
parable corporate bonds. 23 The benefits of avoiding the necessity of
registration, while perceived as important, are secondary to the tax
benefits.
While the registration requirements are inapplicable to exempt
offerings, the antifraud provisions contained in the Securities Act,
particularly those of sections 12(2) 24 and 17(a), 25 and in the Se-
2" Bahl & Wasylenko, Conceptualizing and Measuring Government Credit Strength; A
Proposal 5; and Dearborn, Cash Flow as a Measurement of Risk 1, in Collected Papers for
Municipal Credit Information and Credit Quality User/Researcher Seminar (Municipal Fi-
nance Officers' Ass'n, Oct. 31, 1974), on file at the offices of Boston College Industrial &
Commercial Law Review.
2t
 Address by SEC Commissioner John R. Evans, Municipal Finance Officers' Ass'n,
Washington, D.C., Oct. 31, 1974.
22
 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 103(c) and the related regulations describe conditions under
which interest paid on these bonds is exempted from federal income taxation.
23 Since the interest on industrial development bonds is tax exempt in the hands of the
purchaser, the after-tax yield of the bonds is higher than a comparable "corporate" bond at
the same interest rate. Thus, tax exempt bonds may be issued at a lower interest rate and yet
provide a comparable after-tax yield to the investor.
24
 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1970), which provides:
Any person who . . (2) offers or sells a security (whether or not exempted by the
provisions of [§3], other than paragraph (2) of subsection (a) [thereof]), by the use of
any means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate com-
merce or of the mails, by means of a prospectus or oral communication, which
includes an untrue statement of a material fact or omits to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements, in the light of the circumstances under
which they were made, not misleading (the purchaser not knowing of such untruth
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curities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act or the 1934 Act), 26
particularly those contained in section 10(b), 27 in SEC Rule lob-5 28
promulgated thereunder, and section 15(c)(1) 29 and Rule 15c1-2 3 °
or omission), and who shall not sustain the burden of proof that he did not know,
and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have known, of such untruth or
omission, shall be liable to the person purchasing such security from him, who may
sue either at law or in equity in any court of competent jurisdiction, to recover the
consideration paid for such security with interest thereon, less the amount of any
income received thereon, upon the tender of such security, or for damages if he no
longer owns the security.
2.
 15 U.S.C. § 77q (1970), which provides in pertinent part:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities by
the use of any. means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate
commerce or by the use of the mails, directly or indirectly—
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a
material fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to
make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which
they were made, not misleading, or
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser. . . .
(c) The exemptions provided in section [3] shall not apply to the provisions of
this section.
26
 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78jj (1970) [hereinafter cited as the Exchange Act].
27 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970), which provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of
any national securities exchange .. ,
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors.
29 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1974). Rule tOb-5 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any facility of any
national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
Id.
29 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c)(1) (1970), which provides:
No broker or dealer shall make use of the mails or of any means or instrumen-
tality of interstate commerce to effect any transaction in, or to induce the purchase
or sale of, any security (other than commercial paper, bankers' acceptances, or
commercial hills) otherwise than on a national securities exchange, by means of any
manipulative, deceptive ;
 or other fraudulent device or contrivance. The Commission
shall, for the purposes of this subsection, by rules and regulations define such devices
or contrivances as are manipulative, deceptive, or otherwise fraudulent.
3° 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c1-2 (1974). Rule 15c1-2 provides in pertinent part:
(a) The term "manipulative, deceptive, or other fraudulent device or contriv-
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thereunder, are nevertheless applicable. The disclosure documents
which are furnished investors in exempt offerings are designed to
satisfy the requirements of these provisions as well as the expecta-
tions of the investors for information on which to base their invest-
ment decisions. 3 ' Partially because of the inapplicability of section
11 32
 of the Securities Act to exempt offerings, issuers, underwriters
and others connected with the offerings have traditionally per-
formed an investigation of the accuracy and sufficiency of the in-
formation in the disclosure documents that is generally less extensive
than the investigation regarding the verification of information in-
cluded in registration statements for registered offerings. At times,
particular forms 33
 prescribed by the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission (the SEC or the Commission) for the registration of se-
curities under the Securities Act have been relied upon as general
guides in the preparation of these disclosure documents. However,
given the relatively small amounts involved in many such offerings,
the time and particularly the expense connected with a full investi-
gation and with full compliance with the more general registration
forms, such as Form S-1, 34
 is often viewed by the participants as
unnecessary, undesirable, and uneconomical.
In recent years, a number of general deyelopments have oc-
curred in the antifraud area which have an impact on exempt
offerings. Several enforcement proceedings of the Commission and
several proceedings instigated by buyers and sellers of securities
have resulted in both specific applications of the antifraud provi-
sions and interpretations of the extent of disclosure required by
those provisions. 35
 Furthermore, it now appears probable that legis-
lation36
 will be passed by Congress to provide for comprehensive
ance", as used in section 15(c)(1) of the act .. , is hereby defined to include any act,
practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit
upon any person.
(b) The term "manipulative, deceptive, or other fraudulent device or contriv-
ance", as used in section 15(c)(1) of the act, is hereby defined to include any untrue
statement of a material fact and any omission to state a material fact necessary in
order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which
they are made, not misleading, which statement or omission is made with knowledge
or reasonable grounds to believe that it is untrue or misleading.
Id.
31
 See text at notes 52-57 infra.
32
 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1970), which prescribes liability for fraudulent statements or omis-
sions in a registration statement. See note 3 supra. Since an exempt transaction does not
require a registration statement, § 11 does not apply.
33
 E.g., Securities Act Forms S-1, reprinted in 1 CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ¶ 7121, at 6201;
5-7, reprinted in 1 CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep, ¶ 7190, at 6311; 5-16, reprinted in 1 CCH Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. 7291, at 6431.
34
 Securities Act Form S-1, reprinted in 1 CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ¶ 7121, at 6201.
" See generally text at notes 66-69, 92, 95, 102, 105, 152, 159 infra.
36
 Municipal Securities Act of 1974, S. 2474, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
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regulation of activities of municipal securities dealers and to in-
crease the powers of the SEC in this area. Other than the regulation
itself, the most immediate result of these developments probably
will be greatly increased attention, by the Commission and by
private litigants, to transactions in governmental securities, includ-
ing industrial development bonds.
Additional factors which may intensify the trends in the case of
industrial development bonds include: (1) the political controversies
which have continuously arisen in this area; 37 (2) the increases in the
amount of industrial development bonds offered and sold in recent
years" as a result of increased interest rates in the money markets,
increased concern with pollution control, and increased awareness
of the availability of this financing technique; and (3) a shift in
marketing techniques by underwriters of these bonds toward the
techniques used in marketing corporate securities. 39 This shift in
marketing techniques includes greater reliance upon syndication and
upon sales to members of the general public rather than to the
traditional institutional buyers. This often has become necessary in
order to reach new buyers for the larger bond amounts offered and
to offset the relative unavailability of funds which the institutional
buyers are increasingly experiencing. One consequence has been
that underwriters of industrial development bonds now reach inves-
tors who are less sophisticated than the institutions which formerly
dominated the industrial development bond investor market. In
contrast to the institutional investors, these less sophisticated inves-
tors do not employ professional analysts with the ability to recognize
a need for additional information and do not have the capability,
through concentrated purchasing power and direct contact with
the underwriters, to demand and receive this desired additional
information.
The purpose of this article is to consider certain questions
which have been raised regarding the application of the antifraud
provisions to exempt offerings. These questions relate particularly to
the degree of disclosure and to the extent of investigation which
should be undertaken by counsel and by underwriters involved in
such offerings. Many of the conclusions may be extended to other
parties involved in the offerings, but the implications of the specific
roles of these other parties are outside the scope of the article."
37 Cf. Note, 41 Temp. L.Q. 289, 294-97 (1968).
38 See Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, Municipal Securities Act
of 1974, S. Rep. No. 93-1145, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
3 ' See Address by John R. Evans, supra note 21.
4" For a discussion of liabilities and investigatory duties of directors, see Lanza v. Drexel
& Co., 479 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1973) (en bane); Watson, Directors' Liability Under Rule 10b-5,
12 Section un Corp., Banking & Sec. L. Bull. of Tex. St. Bar Ass'n 1 (1974). Regarding
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Because of the special problems relating to governmental securities,
especially industrial development bonds, some emphasis will be
placed in the discussion upon offerings of these securities. Neverthe-
less, the discussion will have general applicability to other exempt
offerings.
II. THE ANTIFRAUD PROVISIONS AND THEIR APPLICATION TO
INVESTIGATORY PROCEDURES IN EXEMPT OFFERINGS
A. Applicable Provisions
Since certain offerings are exempt from the registration re-
quirements, the basic regulatory scheme of the Securities Act is
generally inapplicable to transactions involving securities issued as a
result of those offerings. Consequently, there is no SEC review 41 of
disclosures made in connection with exempt offerings. Section 11, 42
with its liabilities and explicit due diligence defense, 43 is inapplica-
ble. There also is no requirement that any particular form promul-
gated under the Securities Act be used or that any particular pattern
of disclosure be followed. However, certain provisions of the Se-
curities Act are applicable to exempt transactions as well as to
registered offerings. The most important provisions are contained in
section 17, 44
 the general antifraud section of the Securities Act. The
existence of private rights of action under section 17 has been
recognized by a number of courts. 45 In addition, under section 17,
the Commission may take enforcement action (civil, criminal and
adnainistrative) 46 regarding misstatements or omissions in connec-
tion with the offering. Moreover, there is the possibility of an action
brought by purchasers or the Commission pursuant to section
10(b)47
 of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5. 48 The existence of
private rights of action under these provisions 49 is now well-
established.
liabilities and duties of accountants, see Gormley, Accountants' Professional Liability—A
Ten-Year Review, 29 Bus. Law. 1205 (1974).
41
 Securities Act § 8, 15 U.S.C. § 77h (1970), only provides for review of disclosure made
in registered offerings.
15 U.S.C. § 77k (1970). For the text of § 11, see note 3 supra.
See text at notes 90-97 infra.
" 15 U.S.C. § 77q (1970). For the text of § 17, see note 25 supra.
45 E.g., Dorfman v. First Boston Corp., 336 F. Supp. 1089, 1095 (E.D. Pa. 1972);
Schaefer v. First Nat'l Bank, 326 F. Supp. 1186, 1189-90 (N.D. Ill. 1970), appeal dismissed,
465 F.24 234 (7th Cir. 1972); Barnes v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 69 Misc. 2d 1068, 332
N.Y.S.2d 281, 282-84 (Sup. Ct, 1972), modified to grant stay of action, 42 App. Div. 2d 15,
344 N.Y.S.2d 645 (App. Div. 1973). Contra, Dyer v. Eastern Trust & Banking Co., 336 F.
Supp. 890, 903-05 (D. Me. 1971).
46
 Securities Act §§ 8(b), 19, 20, 15 U.S.C. H 77h(b), 77s, 77t (1970).
47
 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970). For the text of § 10(b), see note 27 supra.
4g
 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1974). For the text of the Rule, see note 28 supra.
44
 See Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life. & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971).
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There has been a marked tendency to relax investigatory stand-
ards in exempt offerings as compared to registered offerings. This
is true as to both municipal bonds and other exempt offerings. Since
the issuing governmental bodies generally have access to funds
through the taxing power and other sources to secure the payment of
general obligation bonds, and since investors in governmental bonds
have been relatively few in number 5 ° and have usually been highly
sophisticated in financial matters, the need for a full investigation
has not been felt in the past. 51
In connection with an industrial bond offering, a disclosure
document is prepared and distributed to potential investors, a prac-
tice not uncommon in exempt offerings. As in other offerings of
governmental securities, the disclosure document is usually called an
"official statement." This document contains disclosures relating to,
among other matters, the bond terms and the governing indenture,
a description of the transaction which includes the intended uses of
the proceeds of the offering, and financial and descriptive informa-
tion concerning the company involved. Since the bonds are revenue
bonds to be paid from the proceeds of the lease or purchase by the
company, the information concerning the company is particularly
crucial information for the potential investors. However, reflecting
the somewhat relaxed attitude regarding offers and sales of these
bonds, official statements frequently contain a legend disclaiming
responsibility for the information concerning the company. 52 At
times the legend appears on the first page of the information state-
ment concerning the company. At other times, it appears as part of
a longer "boilerplate" legend on the inside front cover of the official
statement. In effect, such a legend informs the investor that the
underwriter has been given the information by the company, but
that the underwriter accepts no responsibility for the accuracy or
completeness of the information even though contained in the offi-
cial statement. This is therefore an attempt by the underwriter to
avoid liability for misstatements in, or omissions from, the material
5° See Address of John R. Evans, supra note 21.
5 ' The absence of defaults on general obligation bonds since World War II has undoubt-
edly fostered this attitude. See authorities cited at note 20 supra. The financial difficulties of
certain metropolitan areas, such as New York City, and of certain governmental agencies,
such as the New York State Urban Development Corporation, an issuer of bonds supported
by a moral but not a legal obligation of the state of New York, in themselves suggest a need
for reconsideration of these practices. See Wall Street Journal, Feb. 28, 1975, at 32, col. 1;
Wall Street Journal, Mar. 12, 1975, at 28, cols. 1-3.
52 A typical legend provides: The information contained herein as an Appendix to this
Official Statement has been obtained from [the company], and the [governmental body) and
[the underwriters] make no representations as to the accuracy or completeness of such
information."
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concerning the company, even though the underwriter may have
undertaken no investigatory effort concerning that information."
Regardless of the legend, investors probably expect the under-
writers to verify the information to a reasonable extent. 54 This is a
traditional role of underwriters in registered offerings, and inves-
tigatory ability is one of the areas of expertise generally claimed
by underwriters in selecting an issue for sale to the public. One SEC
release contains adverse references to the use of similar legends in
broker-dealer sales literature. 55 From this release, it appears to be
the Commission's view that, while the use of the particular form of
legend involved was not objectionable, the legend was of limited
utility in avoiding liability. Indeed, the Commission has indicated
that, since the protections of the registration requirements of the
Securities Act are not present in such situations, brokers and dealers
may have increased responsibilities to obtain adequate and accurate
information in connection with recommendations made in unregis-
tered distributions of securities, particularly of "obscure . . .
53 Section 17 and Rule l0b-5 impose liability for misstatements in or omissions of
material information upon persons who sell a security (arid § 17 specifically.includes offers).
See notes 25, 28 supra. To the extent that securities are sold through firm commitment
underwritings, as opposed to best efforts underwritings, these provisions are directly applica-
ble to the underwriters since they actually purchase the securities and resell them to the
investors using the disclosure documents as sales literature. Furthermore, the definitions of
"sell" and "offer" in the Securities Act and the Exchange Act are sufficiently broad to include
underwriting activities of even a "best efforts" nature. See Securities Act § 2(3), 15 U.S.C. §
77b(3) (1970); Exchange Act § 3(14), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(14) (1970).
54
 See Rice, Recommendations by a Broker-Dealer: The Requirement for a Reasonable
Basis, 25 Mercer L. Rev. 537, 577-80 (1974).
55 SEC Securities Act Release No. 3411, reprinted in 2 CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep, 11 25,095,
at 18207 (Apr. 10, 1951). The SEC General Counsel was asked to comment on the legality of
"hedge clauses":
While the language of these hedge clauses varies considerably, in substance they
state generally that the information furnished is obtained from sources believed to be
reliable but that no assurance can be given as to its accuracy. Occasionally language
is added to the effect that no liability is assumed with respect to such information. . . .
. . . The question arises . . . whether the result, if not the purpose, of such a
legend is to create in the mind of the investor a belief that he has given up legal
rights and is foreclosed from a remedy which he might otherwise have either at
common law or under the SEC statutes.
In my opinion, the antifraud provisions of the SEC statutes are violated by the
employment of any legend, hedge clause or other provision which is likely to lead an
investor to believe that he has in any way waived any right of action he may
have .
Assuming the truth of the representations as to the source of the information
and the belief that it is reliable, it is my opinion that the mere use of this legend.in
connection with a communication supplying information is not objectionable. This
does not mean, of course, that there would be any justification for representing to the
investor, either when the information is supplied or thereafter, that the effect of the
legend is to relieve the person using it from a liability under the above-mentioned
statutory provisions and rules.
Id. at 18207-08 (emphasis added).
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[securities], with regard to which reliable information is not readily
available. . . ."56 Therefore, it is necessary to examine the degree to
which the underwriters have responsibility for the information ap-
pearing in the disclosure documents. A threshold question, however,
is the meaning of the term "materiality" as used in the antifraud
provisions.
B. Scope of Adequate Disclosure
Liability under the securities laws attaches only for the misuse
of information that is "material." 57 Perhaps the most significant
observation regarding the meaning of the term "materiality" is that
it is almost devoid of concrete meaning of useful value to the
practitioner." The "basic test" of materiality has been said to refer
to "whether 'a reasonable man would attach importance [to the fact
. . . ] in determining his choice of action in the transaction• in
question ..... ' "59 This "encompasses those facts 'which in reason-
able and objective contemplation might affect the value of the corpo-
ration's stock or securities . . . "6a Whatever the boundaries of
even this vague definition, with its ties to the judgment of the
market or to what reasonable investors would do, the Supreme
Court in a recent case constructed, even a more elusive definition:
"All that is necessary is that the facts withheld be material in the
sense that a reasonable investor might have considered them impor-
tant in the making of [his] decision." 61 In addition, disclosure is
required not only of facts relevant to "conservative" investors, but
also those relevant to speculative investors. "The speculators and
chartists of Wall and Bay Streets are also 'reasonable' investors
entitled to the same legal protection afforded conservative trad-
ers."62
The Second Circuit has given a small degree of substance to the
term, although the specificity of the definition may limit its more
general application: "[M]aterial facts include not only information
disclosing the earnings and distributions of a company but also those
88
 SEC Securities Act Release No. 4445, reprinted in 2 CCI-I Fed. Sec, L. Rep. 11 22,753,
at 16625 (Feb. 2, 1962),
87
 See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848-49 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc),
cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
58 See R. Jennings & H. Marsh, Jr., Securities Regulation: Cases and Materials 1127-30
(3d ed. 1972).
89
 List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811
(1965), quoting Restatement of Torts § 538(2)(a), at 86 (1938) (emphasis added),
6° 340 F.2d at 462, quoting Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634, 642 (7th Cir. 1963)
(emphasis added).
61
 Affiliated Ute Citizens v, United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153-54 (1972) (emphasis added).
62
 SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
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facts which affect the probable future of the company and those
which may affect the desire of investors to buy, sell, or hold the
company's securities." 63 A few more specific determinations may
also have some degree of general application. For instance, in Escott
v. BarChris Construction Corp., 64 material omissions included the
nonenforceability of certain contracts". and the existence of certain
contingent liabilities of the registrant under sale and leaseback ar-
rangements. 66
While general parameters of the concept of materiality may be
derived from specific examples of situations involving its applica-
tion," a truly useful definition seems impossible to frame. For the
purposes of this article, it seems best to emphasize the generality and
encompassing nature of the term. This will become especially ap-
parent in the suggestion of due diligence procedures which are
designed to uncover or verify material information. 68 An adequate
understanding of the concept must include proper recognition of the
complexity of some companies as contrasted with the simplicity of
other companies. Briefly stated, materiality is a relative concept. Its
application by the courts to securities transactions should be related
both to the absolute amount of information available concerning a
particular company, and to the significance of the information in
relation to that company and the size of its business. Information
which may be totally insignificant for a larger and more complex
concern may be extremely material for another concern. A cursory
descriptive statement concerning a business, such as that often used
in sales literature for exempt offerings, does not necessarily, and
indeed frequently does not, disclose all the negative or other infor-
mation of which investors should be advised in order to make an
informed investment decision.
C. Reliance Upon Particular Forms as a Basis for Disclosure
The discussion of materiality demonstrates that adherence to a
particular form for registration statements under the Securities Act
6; 401 F.2d at 849.
64 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Annot., 2 A.L.R. Fed. 86 (1969).
6$
	 F. Supp. at 668-69.
66 Id. at 664-65.
67
 A number of authorities have been reviewed by Paul Douglas Budd of Kutak Rock
Cohen Cambell Garfinkle & Woodward, Omaha, Nebraska, for the purpose of extracting
specific examples of material and nonmaterial misrepresentations and omissions in the use of
information in connection with securities transactions to which the antifraud provisions of the
federal securities laws are applicable. The goal is to provide to persons who must make
judgments on materiality questions in connection with the preparation of disclosure docu-
ments for the offering and sale of securities some guidance apart from the very general "tests"
of materiality which have been framed by the courts and the Commission. See Appendix A
infra.
66 See section IV, at 417-22 infra.
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cannot conclusively provide an adequate basis for disclosure in a
particular transaction. Even in registered offerings, the antifraud
provisions override the requirements of a particular form regardless
of whether reliance upon such a form takes into account the spec-
ifications of the Guides for Preparation and Filing of Registration
Statements," Regulation S-X 7 ° and the numerous interpretive re-
leases71 of the Commission. Often, matters not referred to in
the items of the form or the other sources are matters sufficiently
material that investors should be informed of them. SEC Rule
408, 72 promulgated under the 1933 Act, specifically directs that, in
addition to the information required by a form, other material
information must be included in a registration statement "as may be
necessary to make the required statements, in the light of the cir-
cumstances under which they are made not misleading."" Con-
sequently, regardless of the form relied upon, it would not be
advisable to conclude that matters not specifically covered by the
form require no investigation or disclosure.
At times, in determining the items of disclosure required in an
exempt offering, reliance is placed upon an abbreviated registration
form such as Form 5-7. 74 Particular problems which do not arise in
connection with reliance upon Form S-1, 75 arise in connection with
using Form S-7 as a model. For instance, Form S-7 is designed
specifically for use by registrants meeting certain conditions imposed
as a part of an intricate pattern of disclosure under the securities
laws. 76 Among these conditions is the requirement that the regis-
trant be a reporting company under the Exchange Act. 77 The Ex-
64
 The Guides for the Preparation and Filing of Registration Statements, SEC Securities
Act Release No. 4936, reprinted in 1 CCH Fed, Sec. L. Rep. ¶ 3760, at 3303 (Dec. 9, 1968)
[hereinafter referred to as the Guides). See SEC Securities Act Release No. 4936, reprinted in
[1967-69 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L Rep. ill 77,636, at 83370 (Dec. 9, 1968).
7° 17 C.F.R. Part 210 (1974).
71 See, e.g., SEC Securities Act Release No. 5466, reprinted in 11973-74 Transfer Binder]
CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ¶ 79,699, at 83873 n.2 (Mar. 8, 1974); SEC Securities Act Release No.
5451, reprinted in [1973-74 Transfer Binder) CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 79,618, Ed 83655 (Jan.
7, 1974); SEC Securities Act Release No. 5447, reprinted in [1973-74 Transfer Hinder) CCH
Fed. Sec, L. Rep. ¶ 79,607, at 83629 (Dec. 20, 1973).
72
 17 C.F.R. § 230.408 (1974), which states; "In addition to the information expressly
required to be included in a registration statement, there shall be added such further material
information, if any, as may be necessary to make the required statements, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading."
75
 Id. Sec SEC Securities Act Release No. 4886, reprinted in [1966-67 Transfer Binder]
CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 11 77,500, at 82895 (Nov. 29, 1967).
74 SEC Form S-7, reprinted in 1 CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
	 7190, at 6311.
75
 SEC Form S-1, reprinted in 1 CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ¶ 7122, at 6201.
16 See General Instructions to Form 5-7, reprinted in 1 CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ¶ 7190,
at 6311-12.
77 "The registrant [must have] been subject to and [must have] complied in all
respects . . . with the requirements of Sections 13 and 14 of the [1934 Act[ for a period of at
least three fiscal years immediately preceding the filing of the registration statement on this
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change Act requires reporting companies" to register se-
curities and to file with the Commission on a continuing basis
periodic reports" containing extensive financial and other current
information concerning their businesses and related matters and to
send to stockholders at least annually proxy material containing
similar information. 80
The reporting requirements under the Exchange Act may differ
significantly from those of Form S-7. 8 ' Appendix 13 contains a
comparison of the items of Form S-1, Form S-7 and the principal
current reporting forms under the Exchange Act—Forms 10 82 (the
basic registration form) and 10-K83
 (the annual report). From the
chart it can be seen that Form 5-7 requires information comparable
to Form S-1 as to matters specifically relating to the offering, such
as: the plan of distribution; underwriting commission; use of pro-
ceeds; terms of the securities being registered; expenses of the
offering; relationship with the registrant of experts named in the
registration statement; and treatment of proceeds from stock being
registered. In terms of substantive matters concerning the registrant,
very little disclosure is required by Form S-7 as compared with
Form S-1. However, it is important to note that in most of the areas
where no disclosure or abbreviated disclosure is required by Form
S-7, Forms 10 and 10-K (on file with and available for public
inspection through the Commission) require disclosure similar to
that of Form S-1. This close relationship between Form S-7 and the
form." Id. at 6311. See SEC Securities Act Release No. 4886, reprinted in [1966-67 Transfer
Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ¶ 77,500, at 82985 (Nov. 29, 1967). In adopting amendments
to Form S-7, the Commission stated:
This form is a short form which may be used for registration of securities to be
offered to the public for cash by certain companies having established records of
earnings and stability of management and business.
The adoption of the amendments operates to broaden the availability of Form
S-7 and are a part of a program which includes improvement in the disclosure
required in reports under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
SEC, Securities Act Release No. 5100, reprinted in [1970-71 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. 11 77,927, at 80059 (Nov. 12, 1970) (emphasis added), According to Item 11 of Form
S-7, the issuer must state, inter alia: that it is a reporting company; the types of information
contained in proxy statements and that copies may be obtained from the SEC; on which
exchanges the issuer's stock is listed and where reports may be inspected. SEC Form S-7,
Item 11, reprinted in 1 CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 7192, at 6319-2.
78 See Exchange Act §§ 13, 14(d)(1), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m, 78n(d)(1) (1970), which require
certain companies to file with the Commission periodic reports containing extensive financial
and other current information concerning their businesses and related matters and to send to
stockholders proxy material containing similar information.
71 See, e.g., SEC Form 10, reprinted in 3 CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 11 27,301, at 21301;
SEC Form 10-K, reprinted in 3 CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ¶ 31,101, at 22051.
3°
 See SEC Reg. 14A, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14a-1 to -103 (1974).
81
 See Appendix B for a comparison of the items of Form S-1, Form S-7, and Forms 10
and 10K.
82
 Reprinted in 3 CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 11 27,301, at 21301.
33
 Reprinted in 3 CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ¶ 31,101, at 22051.
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current reporting forms is underscored by Item 11 of Form S-7,
which requires inter alia, a reference in the prospectus to the infor-
mation on file at the Commission and to the means of obtaining
copies of that information." Additional prerequisites for the use of
Form S-7 include requirements that there be a continuity of man-
agement of the issuer, an absence of defaults under senior securities,
and certain levels of earnings. 85 From these, it is apparent that the
Commission does not regard the mere availability of additional
information filed under the Exchange Act as sufficient justification
for the omission of the information from a registration statement on
Form S-7.
D. Relationship of Registration Context Disclosure to
Disclosure in Exempt Offerings
The procedural and other safeguards available in registered
offerings, such as Commission review of registration statements, are
not available in an exempt offering. A consequence is that the logic
of the limited permission granted by the Commission for omission of
certain information in a registration context (e.g., use of Form S-7)
cannot necessarily be extended to an exempt offering context. Many
companies involved in exempt offerings are relatively new enter-
prises with short, if any, earnings history and no history of satisfy-
ing the reporting requirements of the Exchange Act. It is especially
important that there be consideration of disclosure of many types of
information relating to various attributes of these companies, al-
though disclosure of such information would not be required by
Form S-7. The inquiry into and search for the proper information to
be disclosed should not end even with full consideration of the
specific items of the more comprehensive Form S-1 and the Com-
mission's specific releases and rules on disclosure. Nothing short of a
full consideration of all the implications of all information of more
than incidental importance to a company can satisfy the mandate of
the antifraud provisions that all material information be disclosed.
It is probable that, in certain circumstances in an exempt
offering, a particular form would call for disclosure of matters
which are not "material." For instance, a relatively short descriptive
statement may be all that is required concerning the business of a
particularly "clean" company. In other cases, a, relatively large
degree of detail may be required. Although some guidelines may be
developed to facilitate disclosure decisions, as indeed the forms and
sr
	
Form S-7, Item 11, reprinted in 1 CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
	 7192, at 6319-22.
See note 77 supra.
65 SEC Form S-7, General Instructions, reprinted in 1 CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep, 11 7192, at
6311-12.
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other sources are designed to do, ultimately it is necessary to de-
velop a sensitivity of judgment as to issues of materiality in the
variety of circumstances which will be encountered. 86
In many respects, the question of the advisability of refraining
from making a disclosure which might otherwise be required by a
reporting form in a registration context, or of omitting other infor-
mation, relates to the strategy of disclosure. In most instances,
disclosure of favorable information is advisable from a marketing
standpoint, but may not be required from a legal standpoint beyond
the provision of information necessary to create a descriptive context
for the offering. However, the antifraud provisions normally would
require disclosure at least of material information which may be
unfavorable from a marketing standpoint. This does not mean, of
course, that unfavorable information need always be presented in its
worst light or even in a negative light. Techniques of draftsmanship,
combined with the proper exercise of judgment as to the degree of
materiality of a specific negative fact, often permit presentation in a
neutral context, or even in a positive context, as a subtle qualifica-
tion to a positive statement. Therefore, satisfaction of the require-
ments of full disclosure of material information, whether pursuant
to or outside the requirements of a form, need not always be as
painful as is sometimes feared.
Certain conclusions with respect to exempt offerings can be
drawn from this discussion. First, in transactions involving com-
panies meeting the requirements of Form 5-7, a minimum procedure
for disclosure documents prepared with the form as a general guide,
should be the inclusion of a reference to information on file with the
Commission and prescribed by Item 11 of that form. Appropriate
representations of the companies, based on the requirements for the
use of Form S-7, should be included in the underwriting agree-
ments. Secondly, in connection with the preparation of disclosure
documents for those companies and for companies not meeting the
requirements of Form S-7, full consideration should be given to
disclosure of information which would be required by Form S-1 in a
registration context, as well as to disclosure of information which
would be required by the Guides, Regulation S-X 87 and the various
interpretive releases of the Commission. While information of this
nature may frequently be nonmaterial for companies meeting the
reporting and other requirements of Form S-7, disclosure of the
information should be made even by these companies in the in-
stances where it may be material. Consideration of disclosure is
56 See note 69 supra.
137 17 C•F.R. Part 210 (1974).
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particularly important for companies not meeting the requirements
of Form 5-7. Full consideration in all cases should be given to
disclosure of information regarding all aspects of the transaction, the
company and the company's buSiness and management, without
regard to whether a form or other source would prescribe disclosure
of that specific type of information. There should be no automatic
rejection of disclosure of any particular type of information. Full
consideration of information entails full knowledge of that informa-
tion and its implications. The only acceptable means for underwrit-
ers to gain that full knowledge is through performance of adequate
due diligence procedures. 88
In short, consideration of the implications of the requirements
of the antifraud provisions for disclosure of "material" information
leads to the conclusion that fulfillment of the requirements of a
particular form and other sources of specific examples by the Com-
mission of information which should be disclosed in registration
statements, while useful, does not necessarily provide an adequate
means for determining sufficient disclosure. Abbreviated forms are
particularly inadequate as general guides to disclosure.
III. STANDARDS FOR LIABILITY OF UNDERWRITERS UNDER
THE ANTIFRAUD PROVISIONS
A. Registered Offerings
Consideration of the applicable investigatory standards and
obligations of underwriters in a registration context provides a use-
ful background for considering the development of those standards
as applied to exempt offerings. Section 1 l " of the Securities Act
establishes liability for specific classes of parties to a registered
transaction. One class is the underwriters." Section 11 further
establishes the criteria for determining liability and provides a "due
diligence" defense for efforts performed to prevent misstatements or
omissions of material information." In effect, the diligence neces-
sary, "that required of a prudent man in the management of his own
property,"92
 is comparable to that required under a negligence stan-
dard. 93
 A similar defense is provided in section 12(2) 94
 relating to
88
 See section IV, at 417-22 infra.
" 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1970). For the text of § 11, see note 3 supra.
q° Securities Act § 11(a)(5), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a)(5) (1970).
q' Securities Act § 11(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b) (1970). See note 3 supra; Annot., 2
A.L.R. Fed. 180 (1969).
92 Securities Act § 1 1 (c), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(c) (1970). See note 3 supra.
93 2 A. Bromberg, Securities Law: Fraud
—SEC Rule 10b-5 § 7.2(4)(d), at 154.1-.2
(1973). This standard should be contrasted with the standard of an ordinary prudent man "in
similar circumstances." See Selheimer v. Manganese Corp. of America, 423 Pa. 563, 573-78,
224 A.2d 634, 640-43 (1966).
94
 77 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1970). For the text of § 12(2), see note 24 supra.
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liabilities for misstatements in or omissions from prospectuses
(broadly defined in section 2(10)) 95 or oral communications. Under
section 12(2), the person who offers or sells a security using a
misleading prospectus must "sustain the burden of proof that he did
not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have
known, of such untruth or omission . . . ."96 This provision applies
to most exempt offerings, but, unlike the general antifraud provi-
sions, does not apply to offers and-sales of a few exempt securities,
including governmental securities." Under these "due diligence"
defenses, if an underwriter or other party who would otherwise be
liable can show that a sufficient degree of investigation was made of
the accuracy and sufficiency of the information in the registration
statement or prospectus, then liability may be avoided. As a practi-
cal matter, this means a very substantial investigatory effort is
necessary.
B. Exempt Offerings
There are several possible levels of culpability at which liability
under the antifraud provisions could be imposed upon underwriters
for misstatements or omissions in connection with exempt offerings.
"Knowledge" is a readily acceptable basis for culpability. Certainly,
liability could not be avoided where the underwriters knew informa-
tion in sales material to be inaccurate or incomplete. Neither could
liability be avoided where the underwriters had significant "notice"
to this effect.
Whether the underwriters are required to take affirmative ac-
tion and to accept responsibility under the antifraud provisions for
investigating the accuracy and sufficiency of the sales material is one
of the central questions posed by this section. Such an obligation
could be applied at differing levels of culpability. If a duty to
investigate is imposed, liability might extend only to matters which
would require a minimal effort to verify: in essence, this would
constitute a gross negligence or recklessness standard. Culpability
might be expanded to encompass acts violative of the duty under an
ordinary negligence standard. This would entail a duty to investi-
gate the sufficiency and accuracy of the information in a manner
similar to the investigation required to establish a due diligence
defense under section 11 as to information contained in a registra-
tion statement. Absolute liability would make underwriters insurers
of the accuracy or completeness of the information in the disclosure
95 15 U.S.C. § 77b(10) (1970).
96 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1970).
97 See note 24 supra & text at notes 15-19 supra.
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documents. This could be accomplished on the theories that the
. general antifraud provisions 98 contain no due diligence defense, as
sections 1 1 and 12(2) explicitly do, and that, as between the under-
writers and the investors, the risk of loss should fall on the former.
An extreme duty of investigation would be imposed by such a
standard since any omission or significant misstatement of material
information would result in liability. Under such a standard, sig-
nificant investigatory efforts in which honest and nonnegligent mis-
takes have resulted in the disclosure of material misleading informa-
tion would result in the same liability as outright fraud.
Unfortunately, it is not possible to determine with any certainty
the direction in which the courts will go in fixing levels of responsi-
bility. The degree of scienter required, if any, for imposition of
liability under the antifraud provisions remains very unsettled and
the courts themselves have produced perplexing results. The best
analyses99 of the numerous ambiguous and conflicting decisions note
that, while several appellate courts have loosely stated that liability
in private damage actions may be imposed for negligence or without
evidence of fraudulent intent under section 17 and Rule 10b-5, no
single case in which such a statement has been made actually
involves conduct less culpable than recklessness, and frequently
such cases involve actual knowledge of the falsity or omission in the
disclosures made in the securities transactions.'°° In Lanza v. Drexel
& Co., 1 ° 1 the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit explicitly
rejected civil liability for damages to private litigants based on a
negligence standard. ] ° 2 However; the circuits which have stated an
acceptance of such a standard are more numerous.'" It should also
be noted that even the Second Circuit accepts a negligence standard
96 See text at notes 24-31 supra.
99 See generally 2 A. Bromberg, supra note 93, § 8.4(585), at 204.213-.218; Bucklo,
Scienter and Rule 10b-5, 67 Nw. Rev, 562, 562-64, 575-90 (1972); Mann, Rule 10b-5:
Evolution of a Continuum of Conduct to Replace the Catch Phrases of Negligence and
Scienter, 45 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1206, 1206-20 (1970); Ruder & Cross, Limitations on Civil
Liability Under Rule 10b-5, 1972 Duke L.J. 1125, 1140-42; Comment, Lanza v. Drexel & Co.
and Rule 10b-5: Approaching the Scienter Controversy in Private Actions, 15 B.C. Ind. &
Corn. L. Rev. 526, 527-35 (1974); Note, Scienter and Rule 10b-5, 69 Colum. L. Rev. 1057,
1060-66 (1969).
111 ° See authorities cited in note 99 supra. See, e.g., Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270, 271,
274 (9th Cir. 1961).
101 479 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir, 1973) (en bane). See B.C. Comment, supra note 99.
102
 479 F.2d at 1304-05. In part, this was based upon an analysis of § 10(b), which
contains the authority for the Commission to promulgate rules prohibiting "any manipulative
or deceptive device or contrivance." 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970), The court opined that "itlhese
words negate a mere negligent omission or misrepresentation," 479 F,2d at 1305.
1 ° 3 E.g,, Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270, 274 (9th Cir. 1961). See Clegg v. Conk, 507 F.2d
1351 (10th Cir, 1974) (causation, reliance, and scienter are required in a 10b-5 action).
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in enforcement actions brought by the Commission for injunctive or
other equitable relief.'"
Even if it is ultimately determined that negligence standards
are inapplicable to many defendants in private litigation situations,
several considerations may lead to the application of a negligence
standard ,to underwriters. These considerations include: (1) the role
of the underwriter as seller of the securities, often in privity with the
buyers; (2) the traditional fiduciary responsibilities of underwriters,
brokers and dealers imposed by the regulatory scheme of the se-
curities laws; (3) the key position of the underwriter often as a party
necessary to the accomplishment of even an exempt distribution of
securities; (4) the normal status of the underwriter as the only party
both adverse to management and in possession of sufficient exper-
tise, funds, personnel, leverage and access to information to under-
take an adequate investigation; (5) the reliance which many inves-
tors place upon the underwriter to make investigations in connection
with the offering; and (6) the economic motivation of the under-
writer for completion of the distribution.' 05 Present in the industrial
development bond situation is the additional factor of the increasing
similarity between bond distribution and distribution of registered
corporate securities.'" This similarity may justify the conclusion
that similar responsibility should be imposed in both situations.
In a few cases, the courts and the Commission have considered
issues regarding duties of underwriters to investigate information
used in disclosure documents prepared for exempt offerings. While
these instances clearly establish the existence of a duty to investigate
the information, they do not provide any substantial assistance in
determining the degree of required investigation—whether liability
extends to a negligence level, or merely to a gross negligence or
recklessness level. In Walston & Co.'" the Commission disci-
plined 1 ° 8
 the underwriter of an offering of governmental securities
and the vice president and manager of the municipal bond depart-
ment of the - firm. Although it was not the principal underwriter, the
1 " SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 854-55 (2d Cir. 1968) (en band), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). See authorities cited in note 99 supra.
1 " See Herzfeld v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, [1973-74 Transfer
Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 94,574, at 95998-99 (1974); I3ucklo, supra note 99, at
595-96; Mann, supra note 99, at 1210-14, 1219-20; Rice, supra note 55, at 549, 551-52,
567-69, 570-72; Comment, 68 Colum. L. Rev. 1411, 1420-22 (1968); Note, 82 Harv. L. Rev.
908, 911-12 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Harvard Note].
ion
	 Address by SEC Commissioner John R. Evans, Municipal Finance Officers'
Ass'n, Washington, D.C., Oct. 31, 1974.
107 SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8165, reprinted in [1966-67 Transfer
Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ¶ 77,474, at 82942 (Sept. 22, 1967).
1 " Id. at 82945-46. The Commission's disciplinary powers with respect to nonmember
broker-dealers are set forth in § 15(b)(5} of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C.
	 78(0)(5) (1970).
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firm participated in the offering of bonds of a real estate develop-
ment district. Its salesmen recommended to customers that the
bonds be purchased, and in some instances referred to them as
"good," "high grade" or "secure" tax-free municipal bonds. The
Commission found, however, that "the bonds were highly specula-
tive and of the most dubious investment quality."'" According to
the Commission, the respondents had a duty to make "diligent
inquiry, investigation and disclosure" of material information in the
sales literature."° Certainly the Commission's statements in this
release as to these obligations and the obligation to ensure that sales
literature is based upon "an adequate investigation so that [it] accu-
rately [reflects] all material facts which a prudent investor should
know""' imply a rather thorough investigatory effort. The refer-
ence to a need for an investigation of the financial condition of the
owner-developer appears to involve a gross negligence level of cul-
pability. However, the reference to a need for investigation of the
land which was to be developed with funds from the offering," 2
which would have disclosed its distance from schools and shopping
areas and its location on an approach to an airport, implies an
obligation higher than that imposed at a gross negligence level,
particularly for a participating, as opposed to the principal, under-
writer. In sum, the required efforts seem to refer to standards
applicable in a registered offering. Moreover, the manager-vice pres-
ident was said to have "willfully" violated the antifraud provisions
by failing to undertake the investigation. 13
In Isthmus Steamship & Salvage Co., 114 the Commission sus-
pended a Regulation A exemption" 5 and imposed disciplinary
action upon an underwriter in the offering. 16 Although certain
obvious misstatements and omissions in connection with the sales
m" [1966-67 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 11 77,474, at 82944 (Sept. 22,
1967).
11 " Id. at 82944-45. The Commission stated in the release:
It is, moreover, essential that dealers offering such bonds to the public make certain
that the offering circulars and other selling literature are based upon an adequate
investigation so that they accurately reflect all material facts which a prudent
investor should know in order to evaluate the offering before reaching an investment




112 Id. at 82944,
113 Id. at 82945.
' 18 Securities Act Release No. 4716, reprinted in [1964-66 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. 'LI 77,136, at 82132 (Aug. 20, 1964).
"s Id. at 82135. SEC Reg. A (SEC Rules 251-63), 17 C.F.R. 4* 230.251-.263 (1974),
promulgated pursuant to Securities Act * 3(b), 15 U.S.C. 4 77c(b) (1970).
116
 [1964-66 Transfer Binder' CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 11 77,136, at 82137-38.
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presentations cloud the issue to some degree, the Commission did
focus upon the degree of investigation of the information contained
in the offering circular. The issuer was a salvage company which
owned the .salvage rights to a sunken vessel. According to the
Commission, the underwriter had failed to "fulfill his duty . . to
exercise care, reasonable under all the circumstances, to satisfy
himself as to the adequacy and accuracy of the offering circular."" 7
The failure to verify a version, furnished by the issuer, of a manifest
purporting to list the goods on the vessel was considered a "willful"
violation of the antifraud provisions. 18 In Albert J. DiGiacomo,
dlbla Albert James Co.,I 19 an underwriter was disciplined for par-
ticipating in an unregistered offering "without making a sufficiently
reasonable and diligent inquiry into the nature and worth of the
stock.": 2° Again, this was described as a "willful" violation of the
antifraud provisions. 121
It is interesting that these violations were considered "willful."
Such a finding was, of course, necessary since section 15(b)(5) of the
Exchange Act' 22
 requires such a conclusion in disciplinary cases.
It7
 Id. at 82137. The Commission stated:
The underwriter] was aware that such appeal as the offering had lay primarily in
the prospects for the salvage of the [vessel's] cargo, and that therefore the representa-
tions as to this matter in the offering circular were crucial. The unsigned and
undated "Itemized Manifest," [prepared by the issuer] which was the sole basis for
the statements in the offering circular, was shown to [the underwriter], but he made
no effort to verify the information contained therein. Neither did he make inquiry of
his attorney as to the verity of this document, or as to what constituted the attorney's
"investigation" of [the issuer]. We therefore find, as did the hearing examiner, that




 SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7572, reprinted in [1964-66 Transfer
Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ¶ 77,227, at 82327 (Apr. 12, 1965).
' 2 ° Id. at 82328. According to the Commission:
Such an inquiry would have revealed that the offering circular which he used in
connection with this underwriting contained false and misleading statements of
material facts regarding the company's business and financial condition, its capital
structure and its future prospects. Such facts related to, among other things, the
company's expenses and income, agreements to issue stock to a former director and
to repurchase stock for the benefit of certain creditors, the book and future value of
the stock, the production and sale of engines, the identity of the assignee of the
exclusive license to manufacture J-F engines, and the assignment to creditors of title
to certain equipment.
Id.
121 Id. See also Charles E. Bailey & Co., 35 S.E.C. 33, 41-43 (1953); Guardian Inv.
Corp., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7284, reprinted in [1961-64 Transfer
Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ¶ 76,992, at 81650 (Apr. 1, 1964); Heft, Kahn & Infante,
Inc., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7020, reprinted in [1961-64 Transfer Binder]
CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 9 76,897, at 81313 (Feb. i1, 1963); Alexander Reid & Co., SEC
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6727, reprinted in [1961-64 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. ¶ 76,823, at 81071 (Feb. 8, 1962).
177
 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(5) (1970).
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Where the "willfulness" is interpreted as a failure to investigate
information in some detail, as opposed to a deliberate use of infor-
mation known to be untrue, a firm due diligence obligation has been
established. A finding of willfulness may avoid a relatively complex
technical issue raised by the federal district court in Thiele v.
Shields, 123 a decision that is particularly applicable to offerings of
governmental securities.
In Thiele, the court found that underwriters of governmental
securities could be held liable under the general antifraud provisions
despite their particular exemption from liability under section 12(2)
for misstatements and omissions. 124
 Since section 12(2) liability
may be imposed for negligence, 125 the court reasoned that the sec-
tion 12(2) exemption from liability for negligent misrepresentations
and omissions in offerings of governmental securities must have
been intended by Congress to extend as well to section 17(a) of the
Securities Act 126 and section 10(b) of the Exchange Act' 27 although
no such exemption is explicitly stated in those provisions. 128 The
court concluded that antifraud liability for misstatements or omis-
sions in connection with the offering and sale of governmental
securities must be based upon a "knowing or intentional" misrep-
resentation and not upon failure to exercise "reasonable care in
investigating the truth of a representation."' 29 No other decision
seems to have fully considered this narrow issue of statutory con-
struction.
The Thiele theory is undercut, however, by several factors.
These include (1) the Commission's approach of making a failure to
investigate a "willful" violation;' 30 (2) the rapid expansion of the
application of the antifraud provisions since the date of the Thiele
decision; and (3) the numerous decisions and authorities, particu-
larly in the case of Commission enforcement actions, which rely
113 131 F. Supp. 416 (S,D.N.Y. 1955).
124 Id. at 418-20.
' 23 See note 24 supra,
126
 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1970).
127 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970).
128
 131 F. Supp. at 418-20.
129
 Id. at 419. See also Dorfman v. First Boston Corp. 336 F. Supp. 1089, 1095 (E.D,
Pa. 1972) (reading § 12(2) limitations into § 17(a)(2), but not into §§ 17(a)(1) or (3) which
specifically refer to "fraud;" § 10(b) was not in issue); Drake v. Thor Power Tool Co,, 282 F.
Supp. 94, 98-102 (N.D. Ill. 1967) (reading § 12(2) limitations generally into the antifraud
provisions); Trussell v. United Underwritirs, Ltd., 228 F. Supp. X157, 767 (D. Colo. 1964)
(referring in dictum to the requirement in Thiele v. Shields of knowing or intentional action in
connection with sales of governmental securities). Compare Montague v. Electronic Corp. of
America, 76 F. Supp. 933 (S.D.N, Y. 1948) (denying relief under § 10(b) in an action to which
§ 11 was applicable) with Rosenberg v. Globe Aircraft Corp., 80 F. Supp. 123 (E. D. Pa.
1948) (applying requirements of § 11 to an action under § 10(b)).
' 3° See text at notes 107-22 supra.
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upon a negligence standard in other types of offerings.' 31 Adding
further doubt and confusion, some courts have explicitly rejected
the general principles of statutory construction in securities cases
which would extend the limitations found in sections 11 and 12(2) to
actions under section 17(a) of the Securities Act, and section 10(b) of
the Exchange Act. 132 Therefore, it is increasingly doubtful that
underwriters can avoid liability for misstatements in or omissions
from the disclosure documents even in offerings of governmental
securities where the error could have been corrected by the exercise
of due diligence.
Some support for such a position appears in SEC v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co., 133
 where corporate management was held responsible
to exercise "due diligence" in verifying information contained in a
press release. 134 This result would seem to be based in part upon
consideration of the fiduciary relationship of management to the
stockholders and investing public. 135 Underwriters have a similar
fiduciary role. Consequently, it would seem relatively easy for a
court, utilizing hindsight, to find that an underwriter had "notice"
or "reason to believe" that information was inaccurate or incom-
plete, or that (even if a negligence standard should be inapplicable)
such an error could have been corrected through "minimal" inves-
tigatory efforts which were not undertaken.
It must be concluded that underwriters of exempt offerings
have a substantial obligation to investigate information furnished by
management for use in disclosure documents. The extent of the
obligation is probably set at a negligence level, as it is in registered
offerings, at least in Commission disciplinary and enforcement ac-
tions.Therefore, due diligence procedures, similar to those in regis-
tered offerings, should be undertaken in exempt offerings for the
protection of the underwriters and their principals. Following less
comprehensive procedures would entail a serious and substantial
risk of liability in private actions and an even greater risk of penal-
ties in actions initiated by the Commission.
In sum, the risks of liability are considerable. Since underwrit-
ers are accustomed to thinking in business terms, it might seem
reasonable as a business judgment to prefer, on grounds of practical-
ity, to accept the risks of liability on a gamble that the aggregate
cost of investigation in all transactions is likely to be greater than
131 See text at notes 107-21 supra,
132
 See, e.g., Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270, 273-74 (9th Cir. 1961).
133
 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en bane), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
134 401 F.2d at 863.
231
 See SEC v. Spectrum, Ltd., 489 F.2d 535, 541-42 (2d Cir. 1973) (attorney could be
liable on similar considerations for issuing an opinion without an adequate investigation).
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liabilities which may be incurred in a few transactions. Such a
decision could result in lower ultimate cost to investors and a greater
availability of funds to the issuers whose own investigations would
be duplicated by the underwriters. However, a decision to accept
the status of an insurer fails to take into consideration the poten-
tially severe effects of disciplinary or enforcement actions by the
Commission. Additionally, the provisions of section 15 of the Se-
curities Act' 36 and section 20 of the Exchange Act"' in many
instances impose liability upon "controlling persons" of violators,
and it would not seem feasible, financially or professionally, for
individual members of underwriting firms to accept the imposition
of remedies for violations as a "business risk."
IV. THE MEANING OF "DUE DILIGENCE"
Since underwriters of exempt offerings have a substantial duty
to investigate and verify information furnished by management for
the disclosure documents, it is appropriate to consider specific due
diligence procedures which may be followed to satisfy this duty.
Unfortunately, the Commission has not published guides or stan-
dards for these procedures, although it has requested the National
Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) to do so.' 38 The sole
substantial authority appears to be the proposed amendment to the
Rules of Fair Practice of the NASD, formulated in response to the
Commission's request.' 39 While other sources contain a few useful
suggestions,' 4 ° in general they are quite inadequate for a full de-
scription of the investigation which should be undertaken. There-
fore, to assist in the development of due diligence procedures, a
fairly comprehensive list of activities which should be undertaken is
set forth below.
Among the important factors to bear in mind in connection
with the performance of the procedures are that (1) the procedures
136
 15 U.S.C. § 77o (1970).
137 15 U.S.C. § 78t (1970).
138 SEC Securities Act Release No. 5274, reprinted in 11972-73 Transfer Binder] CCH
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 78,905, at 81950-51 (July 25, 1972).
139 The proposal has been published in Messer, Roles and Reasonable Expectations of
the Underwriter, Lawyer and Independent Securities Auditor in the Efficient Provision of
Verified Information: "Truth in Securities" Reinforced, 52 Neb. L. Rev. 429, 473-77 (1973).
I'm See Henkel, Liability of Counsel for Underwriter, 24 Bus. Law. 641, 651-55 (1969);
Israels, Preparation of Registration Statement: Issuer's Counsel—Advice to My Client, 24
Bus. Law. 537 (1969); Isruels, Checklist for Underwriters' Investigation, 18 Bus. Law. 90
(1962); Whitney, Underwriters' Counsel—Advice to My Client: That Which Is Impossible
Must Go Away," 24 Bus, Law. 585 (1969); Harvard Note, supra note 105, at 910-16; Note,
The Underwriter's Duty of "Due Diligence" Under Section 11 of the Securities Act: Reflections
on BarChris, 22 Vand. L. Rev. 386, 394-405 (1969); Sommer, Memorandum Re: Escott v.
BarChris Construction Corporation (1969) (unpublished) on file at the offices of Boston
College Industrial & Commercial Law Review.
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should be undertaken up to the date of closing to prevent misrep-
resentations and omissions resulting from last minute events; (2) one
of the most effective safeguards is to become involved in offerings
relating only to companies with reliable managements; (3) even in
those cases, a healthy and severe skepticism must be exercised
regarding the information furnished by management, evidenced by
considerable questioning and discussion of that information; (4) a
reasonable investigation must be undertaken as to every item of
possibly material information, even from the most authoritative
sources; (5) financial information (other than that relating to short
unaudited periods) should be certified by accountants who are
skilled in accounting matters under the securities laws; and (6) the
underwriters should always be represented in the preparation of the
disclosure documents and in the conduct of their investigation by
legal counsel skilled in practicing under the securities laws. The
performance of the suggested procedures should be further consid-
ered to include a qualification related to the reasonable availability
of information, similar to the qualification provided for the prepara-
tion of registration statements in SEC Rule 409. 141
Some allowance for the financial stability of the company also
seems reasonable, and a correspondingly greater duty would appear
for an underwriter dealing with a less stable issuer. 142 Companies
with managements accustomed to satisfying the disclosure require-
ments of the federal securities laws are generally more reliable and
exercise a greater degree of care in the collection and preparation of
disclosure information. Therefore, depending upon the facts in a
particular case, it would seem reasonable to modify certain of the
verification procedures for the more stable and experienced issuers,
such as those meeting the requirements of Form S-7. 143 Neverthe-
less, even in these situations, the procedures (subject to appropriate
141
 17 C.F.R. § 230.409 (1974), which states:
Information required need be given only insofar as it is known or reasonably
available to the registrant. If any required information is unknown and not reason-
ably available to the registrant, either because the obtaining thereof would involve
unreasonable effort or expense, or because it rests peculiarly within the knowledge of
another person not affiliated with the registrant, the information may be omitted,
subject to the following conditions:
(a) The registrant shall give such information on the subject as it possesses
or can acquire without unreasonable effort or expense, together with the sources
thereof.
(b) The registrant shall include a statement either showing that unreason-
able effort or expense would be involved or indicating the absence of any
affiliation with the person within whose knowledge the information rests and
stating the result of a request made to such person for the information.
142 See Charles E. Bailey & Co., 35 S.E.C. 33, 41-42 (1953); Henkel, supra note 140, at
648; Rice, Recommendations by a Broker-Dealer: The Requirement for a Reasonable Basis,
25 Mercer L. Rev. 537, 567-69 (1974).
143 See text at notes 74-85 supra.
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modifications) should be carried out as to events and information
relating to periods subsequent to prior investigations performed by
the firm. The important point is to avoid accepting management's
representations as the final authority where verification is reason-
ably possible.'"
The specific procedures which are recommended are:
1. Review of all basic corporate documents for the company
and its subsidiaries, such as articles of incorporation and by-laws,
with all amendments thereto, using original or other authoritative
sources for each; •
2. Joint conferences attended by principal company officials,
accountants, company counsel, representatives of the underwriters,
and underwriters' counsel (1) to provide background, (2) to consider
general issues and (3) to raise specific issues and thoroughly probing
questions arising in the course of the performance of other due
diligence activities;
3. Separate conferences with each principal company official
and the head of each significant subsidiary, division and department
regarding his background, company matters under his supervision
and the adequacy of descriptive language in the disclosure docu-
ments in describing material matters fully and accurately;
4. Obtaining satisfactory written answers by all directors and
principal officials of the company to a comprehensive set of ques-
tions based on the items in Form S-1, with the questions tied
directly to the disclosure documents and passing on the accuracy
and sufficiency of those documents and particular portions thereof in
providing material information for investors;
5. Review of the minute books and stock records of the com-
pany and its subsidiaries covering all meetings and other events
prior to the date of closing (unless a transfer agent or registrar is
used, in which case basic verification as to amounts of issued se-
curities and numbers of security holders may be obtained from such a
source in the form of a certificate);
6. Comparison of previous financial statements of the company .
and of information (including financial statements and exhibits)
regarding the company filed with the Commission within a given
period, such as the previous ten years;
7. Review of recent financial statements for information which
may have been inadequately disclosed in the text of the disclosure
documents and for determination of trends and other issues (such as
contingent liabilities) which may need further explanation in the
financial statements' or in the text. This may include review of
'" See Richmond Corp,, 41 S.E.C. 398 (1963); Charles E. Bailey & Co., 35 S.E.C. 33
(1953); Harvard Note, supra note 105, at 910.
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matters of an unusual nature or complexity, consultation with out-
side accountants for an explanation of the treatment used in the
financial statements and the adequacy and implications thereof;
8. Review of the circumstances surrounding changes in com-
pany auditors during the previous ten years;
9. Obtaining an adequate "cold comfort" letter from the ac-
countants covering the period from the end of the period to which
the certified financial statements relate to (1) the date of sale and (2)
the date of closing, and making adequate comparisons with the
periods covered by the certified financial statements;
10. Obtaining available information on the company, its sub-
sidiaries and their officials from recognized services providing finan-
cial ratings and other information on corporations;
11. Review of all possibly material company contracts for legal
enforceability and for determinations of materiality and adequacy of
descriptive language in the disclosure documents. This should in-
clude a review of a representative sampling of all groups of similar
contracts which are possibly material in the aggregate but not mate-
rial on an individual basis (e.g., a close review of five to ten of 30
voluminous lease agreements alleged to have substantially similar
terms and, if those reviewed are in fact substantially similar, a more
cursory review of the remaining agreements for basic terms such as
rentals payable, expiration dates and facilities leased and for terms
which appear to vary from the basic form of the documents);
12. Review of all employee plans (such as option, pension and
profit sharing plans), budgets, backlog information, internal projects
(including projected uses of proceeds of the offering), and plans of
operation for the company and its subsidiaries (such as projected
financing, supply or other needs and means of satisfying these
needs);
13. Review of all possibly material patents, trademarks,
copyrights, business secrets and other protective devices and the
extent to which they protect the business and its confidential infor-
mation;
14. Review of pleadings and other relevant information, and
discussions with company counsel, regarding pending and
threatened litigation;
15. Obtaining satisfactory opinions of company counsel on
legal matters of particular interest (such as the existence and proba-
ble outcome of litigation, title to material properties, and antitrust
and securities issues) where significant questions on such matters
arise;
16. Where appropriate (e.g., where the company and its sub-
sidiaries may be particularly dependent upon banking relationships
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or a very small number of customers or suppliers), discussions with
parties having special relationships with the company and its sub-
sidiaries when particular information involving these parties or to
which they may have special access appears material;
17. Where adequate information appears available and direct
contact with certain parties referred to in paragraph 16 would be
especially difficult or sensitive, a review of correspondence files
relating to those parties as an alternative to the procedures described
in paragraph 16;
18. Obtaining information from bond trustees on relationships
with the company;
19. Tours of possibly material facilitieg (including an adequate
sampling of facilities which may be material in the aggregate and
which are alleged to be substantially similar), particularly tours of
new facilities which have not been previously visited, with a view to
(1) understanding the business and methods of operations, (2) verify-
ing the existence and condition of the facilities, (3) determining the
adequacy of descriptive language in the disclosure documents and
(4) discussing matters of interest with lower level management and
employees as a means of verifying information furnished by top
management;
20. Obtaining information on the business of the company and
its subsidiaries from engineering, production, marketing and other
relevant business studies, and from trade publications, trade associ-
ations and other sources, including such information as identity, size
and importance of principal industry competitors, the overall indus-
try competitive structure, technological trends and supply and con-
sumption problems;
21. Obtaining comprehensive representations and warranties
from the company in the underwriting agreements, with certification
as to continued accuracy thereof at the closing by the appropriate
company officials (e.g., generally, the president and treasurer or
comptroller on financial matters and the president and secretary on
corporate records and issuances of stock);
22. In general, using every reasonable opportunity for obtain-
ing from the best possible sources documentary and other verifica-
tion of the accuracy and adequacy of each item of material informa-
tion furnished by management in connection with the preparation of
the disclosure documents, taking into account (with no single factor
being fully determinative) (1) the time involved, (2) the expense
involved, (3) the amount of money involved in the transaction, (4)
the probable importance of the information to be obtained, (5) the
reliability of the source, (6) the likelihood of access by the source to
accurate and complete information of the nature desired, (7) the
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availability of alternative sources, and (8) possible consequences to
the company of the inquiries, such as sensitivity of the source to
inquiries of the nature which may be made (although at times, the
sensitivity of the source may indicate the importance of an inquiry);
23. Retaining and, where necessary, preparing documentary
evidence and records in memoranda and other forms describing in
moderate detail the investigatory activities to the date of closing and
the results of the investigation.
Upon completion of these procedures for each offering, the
underwriters should be in a position to convince judicial or adminis-
trative officials of the fulfillment of any obligations of the underwrit-
ers under the antifraud provisions. It is probable that the present
rate structure for underwritings of exempt offerings does not permit
the fulfillment of these procedures in any substantial manner. Low
commission levels, however, should not be relied upon as a defense
against potential actions by private litigants or the SEC. Rather, in
view of the developing applications of the antifraud provisions, it
will probably become necessary for the rate structure to respond to
the expenses incurred in the satisfaction of the due diligence obliga-
tions of underwriters. It will also be necessary for the rate structure
to respond to changes in marketing techniques such as those used
for offerings of industrial development bonds. These changes in
marketing techniques have made the present rate structure less
profitable than in the past. One result of the strong degree of
protection of investors which is being required by the strict applica-
tion of the antifraud provisions is a greater cost of raising capital.
V. THE ROLE OF COUNSEL
A. Introduction
While the underwriters of exempt offerings have a substantial.
obligation to investigate and verify the information concerning the
company, it is likely that they frequently do not fulfill this obliga-
tion. In part, this_ is because the obligation has only fairly recently
become apparent through developing trends in the law and changes
in the techniques of conducting certain exempt offerings, such as
industrial development bond offerings. This failure on the part of
the underwriters could result in problems for counsel. It is possible
for several law firms to be involved in an exempt offering. For
instance, in an industrial development bond offering, the company
may be represented by its counsel in connection with the negotiation
of the terms of the transaction and the preparation of the disclosures
in the official statement. The underwriters may be represented by
their counsel on these matters as well. The governmental body is
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represented by its counsel to ensure that it will have no obligation
for the payment of the indebtedness evidenced by the bonds except
to the extent of the proceeds from the lease or sale to the company.
Unlike the usual corporate securities transaction, another type
of counsel, called "bond counsel," is generally involved in an indus-
trial development bond offering. Reliance upon such counsel is a
tradition stemming from the nature of the industrial development
bond transaction as, technically, an issue of a security of the gov-
ernmental body. Bond counsel has long been responsible for matters
regarding the validity of the issuance of the bonds under the appli-
cable state law. Bond counsel also considers tax questions under
federal and state law. The opinions of different bond counsel are
addressed to various parties, sometimes running to the company or
the governmental body, sometimes to the underwriters and some-
times to the investors. Frequently, a particular bond counsel is
employed by the company at the insistence of the underwriters. In
these circumstances, the identity of the bond counsel's client is not
always clear.
In many exempt transactions, particularly the smaller ones, the
principals in the offering consider it uneconomical to retain a large
number of attorneys. Insofar as the underwriters are concerned, this
is in part due to the much lower rate structure for underwriting
commissions and discounts in these transactions as compared to
registered offerings. As a consequence, company counsel, or, in an
industrial development bond offering, bond counsel, may be the
only counsel which is relied upon in such a transaction. This means
that the underwriters, and even the company, may not be rep-
resented by counsel experienced in the preparation of disclosure
documents under the federal securities laws despite their responsibil-
ity for the preparation of the disclosure documents and the investi-
gation and verification of the information contained therein. The
retained counsel may have no securities law expertise. This is par-
ticularly true of bond counsel since their opinions generally do not
cover such matters. Consequently, it is apparent that the obligations
of the parties under the securities laws are not discharged. Retained
counsel have responded to these problems in different ways.
Where the securities problems are ignored, counsel, particularly
bond counsel, which has become concerned about its participation
in what may be violations of the securities lams by the company and
the underwriters, has declined to participate in meetings or discus-
sions regarding the information in the disclosure documents except
to the extent its opinion directly relates to this information (such as
in a "Tax Matters" section). Presumably, this is to minimize infer-
ences of "notice" to counsel of securities law problems arising in
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connection with the transaction. In other cases, counsel has insisted
that some investigation be conducted. However, this does not al-
ways result in performance of an adequate investigation, since the
participants in the transaction are unaccustomed to or are unwilling
to perform a full-fledged due diligence inquiry. In such cases, the
attitude of counsel has been based upon a feeling that some investi-
gation, however inadequate, is better than no investigation at all. In
other cases, the underwriters of an industrial development bond
offering, fearing liability, may employ bond counsel not only with
respect to the issuance of the traditional bond counsel opinion but
also to monitor or conduct the investigation.
B. Theories of Liability of Counsel: Applicability
of the ABA Code
The purpose of this section is to consider the possibilities of
successful litigation by private litigants or the Commission against
counsel involved in exempt transactions. Several areas which may
give rise to liability will be discussed after an initial examination of
the implications of professional conduct standards imposed upon
these attorneys.
The theories of attorneys' liability which will be discussed are
theories which generate considerable controversy among members of
the bar. They involve new approaches which could make the task of
the securities practitioner extremely difficult considering the fact
that the practice of securities law requires numerous fine judgments
concerning factual and legal interpretations. These judgments must
be made in a very complex and highly-pressured context. This
difficulty is intensified by the rapidly changing interpretations of the
securities laws which are often being applied expansively and re-
trospectively.
In part, the controversy has been viewed as a conflict between
the interpretations of the Commission and other authorities as to
"public interest" responsibilities of attorneys on the one hand and,
on the other, the traditional conceptions of the responsibilities of
attorneys to their clients under the old ABA Canons of Ethics 145 and
the present ABA Code of Professional Responsibility. 146 However,
in at least some respects, this conflict may be more apparent than
real. The ABA Code itself reflects the conflicting considerations. It
must also be noted that the facts upon which the expansive pro-
nouncements by the courts and the Commission are based often
' 45 ABA Canons of Professional Ethics.
146 ABA Code of Professional Responsibility [hereinafter cited as ABA Code).
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involve relatively extreme behavior on the part of the attorneys
concerned. 147
As a background for the discussion of the various potential
theories of liability of counsel, it is useful to review those provisions
of the ABA Code pertinent to the issues. One relevant consideration
is the obligation of an attorney under Canon 4 to "preserve the
confidences and secrets of a client."'" Adding definition to this,
Ethical Consideration 4-1 states:
Both the fiduciary relationship existing between
lawyer and client and the proper functioning of the legal
system require the preservation by the lawyer of confi-
dences and secrets of one who has employed or sought to
employ him. A client must feel free to discuss whatever he
wishes with his lawyer and a lawyer must be equally free
to obtain information beyond that volunteered by his
client. . . . The observance of the ethical obligation of a
lawyer to hold inviolate the confidences and secrets of his
client not only facilitates the full development of facts
essential to proper representation of the client but also
encourages laymen to seek early legal assistance. 149
Ethical Consideration 4-5 adds: "A lawyer should not use informa-
tion acquired in the course of the representation of a client to the
disadvantage of the client .. .." 150
 Disciplinary Rule 4-101(B)(1) 151
states that "[e]xcept when permitted under DR 4-101(C), a lawyer
shall not knowingly . . reveal a confidence or secret of his
client. "' 52
Disciplinary Rule 4-101(C) 153
 lists certain situations in which
a lawyer may reveal confidences or secrets of a client. This Disci-
plinary Rule does not impose an Obligation for disclosure of the
information. One class of information which may be revealed by the
attorney is "Mlle intention of his client to commit a crime and the
information necessary to prevent the crime."'" While this Disciplin-
ary Rule is framed in permissive terms, it is cross-referenced to
1 " 7 See Karmel, Attorneys' Securities Laws Liabilities, 27 Bus. Law, 1153, 1155-60
(1972).
148
 ABA Code, Canon No. 4.
149 ABA Code, EC 4-1.
11° ABA Code, EC 4-5.
151
 ABA Code, DR 4-101(B)(1).
153 Id.
153 ABA Code, DR 4-101(C).
154
 ABA Code, DR 4-101(C)(3).
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Opinion 314 155
 which "indicates that a lawyer must disclose even
the confidences of his clients [protected by the attorney-client
privilege as well as the ethical rules] if 'the facts in the attorney's
possession indicate beyond reasonable doubt that a crime will be
committed.' " 156
 Prior to 1974, Disciplinary Rule 7-102(8) 157 had
added a further mandatory tone to the obligation to disclose certain
confidences and secrets of a client:
A lawyer who receives information clearly establishing
that his client has, in the course of the representation,
perpetrated a fraud upon a person or tribunal shall
promptly call upon his client to rectify the same and if his
client refuses or is unable to do so, he shall reveal the fraud
to the affected person or tribunal)"
However, this rule was amended at the 1974 Midyear meeting of the
House of Delegates of the American Bar Association to add at the
end the phrase "except when the information is protected as .a
privileged communication. " 159 Therefore; where it is indicated
beyond a reasonable doubt that a crime will be committed, an
obligation of disclosure exists under the ABA Code.
Disciplinary Rule 7402(B), 160
 however, places the attorney
in a difficult position in borderline cases involving fraud disclosed to
the attorney as committed during the course of the representation,
during which time the information may be subject to the attorney-
client privilege. 161 If it is subject to the privilege, disclosure by the
155 ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Opinions, No. 314 (1965) [hereinafter cited as
ABA Opinion 314].
156 ABA Code, DR 4-101(C)(3) n.16, quoting ABA Opinion 314, supra note 155 (em-
phasis added).
157 ABA Code, DR 7-102(B).
158 Id. (emphasis added). But see ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Opinions, No.
287 (1953) (prohibiting an attorney from divulging perjury committed during a completed
divorce proceeding where the other party, but not the court, was aware of the falsehood, but
mandating a refusal to continue to represent the client if the client refuses to make disclosure
on his own). According to the American Bar Association, the reference to "fraud" in DR 7-
102(B) contemplates fraud "in the common law, or, at least in a traditional or conventional
sense," thus excluding the broader concepts of fraud under the antifraud provisions. Report
on the Code of Professional Responsibility in the Context of the Committee's "Phase I
Inquiry," ABA Comm. on Counsel Responsibility, Section of Corp., Banking & Bus. L.,
10-11 (unpublished 5th draft, Jan. 22, 1975) [hereinafter cited as ABA Phase I Report].
155 ABA, 1974 Midyear Meeting: Summary of Action and Reports to the House of
Delegates, Reports 118 and 117 (1974). The "privileged communications" which are pro-
tected may be only those covered by the attorney-client privilege, rather than the broader
obligations under the Code to protect the "confidences" and "secrets" of clients. ABA Phase I
Report, supra note 158, at 11.
' 6° ABA Code, DR 7-102(B).
161 After noting that ABA Opinion 314, supra note 155, seems to have established, as of
1965, a new obligation to disclose prospective illegal activity and that Disciplinary Rule
7-102(B), as it existed prior to the 1974 amendment, appeared "to make a clean break with the
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attorney is forbidden by Disciplinary Rule 4-101(B)(1). If the infor-
mation is not subject to the privilege, disclosure is required by
Disciplinary Rule 7-102(B). An erroneous determination as to the
existence of the privilege could mean a violation of a Disciplinary
Rule. However, there is a safety valve. If there remains a reason-
able doubt that a crime will be committed, the obligation ends and
the permissive provisions of Disciplinary Rule 4-101(C) become
applicable so long as there is merely an "intention" of the client to
commit a crime. This may save the attorney from liability in a
securities context when the client's actions reflect an intention to
commit an act which would constitute a crime, presumably even
though a reasonable doubt may exist that a crime actually will be
committed. If the ABA Code did not at least permit disclosure by
the attorney under such circumstances, positions taken by the
Commission requiring disclosure of such information, 162 if applied
past view of an attorney's obligation to disclose his client's fraud," one commentator has
stated: "It is probably fair to say that few lawyers appreciated the increased emphasis on
public accountability manifested in [ABA Opinion 314) and Disciplinary Rule 7-102(B)."
Freeman, Opinion Letters and Professionalism, 1973 Duke L.J. 371, 433. Since the amend-
ment to Disciplinary Rule 7-102(B) was passed, it is apparent that this failure has now been
appreciated and that the ABA Code no longer emphasizes "public accountability" to the same
extent.
If we bear in mind the recognition by the ABA Code of the considerations placing
conflicting demands upon an attorney, and the manner in which it resolves these matters, we
will be assisted in the development of a rational analysis of the potential theories of liability of
counsel.
162
 Regarding the duty which the Commission is attempting to create, one commentator
has stated:
[It) would conflict with one of the basic social' policies underlying the attorney-client
privilege: that of encouraging clients to seek legal advice. Indeed, to burden se-
curities lawyers with a general burden of public disclosure could be counterproduc-
tive. The corporate securities bar today, because of its skills in fact gathering and
dissemination and its high standard of professional responsibility, plays a vital role
in realizing the goals of the securities laws and ensuring that the flow of information
to the investing public is as complete and accurate as possible. Were corporate
managers to feel that their attorneys were no longer entitled to act in their traditional
role of confidential counselor to corporate clients, they might be less inclined to
communicate with their attorneys and become overly cautious about what they
would reveal. The end result might then be less, rather than more disclosure of
material information. Of course, it does not follow that the issuer client will never be
liable where the attorney is not obligated to report a nondisclosure.
Small, An Attorney's Responsibilities Under Federal and State Securities Laws: Private
Counselor or Public Servant?, 61 Calif. L. Rev. 1189, 1227 (1973). The ABA Report takes the
position that disclosure must occur when the client's conduct is part of a "patently fraudulent
continuing scheme" and the attorney continues the representation. However, "since the
lawyer must know that the client's conduct is illegal, it seems apparent that the lawyer must
be protected in his conduct where he acted in good faith, Unless it clearly appears that the
client's conduct is illegal, the lawyer is not free to reveal his secrets." Further, unless acting in
bad faith, if the attorney fails to recognize the problem in a determination of materiality
through inadvertence, or even simple negligence, his conduct should not amount to a
violation of DR 7-102(B)(2) whatever the result of an action for negligence or malpractice.
ABA Phase I Report, supra note 158, at 12, 17, 19.
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to counsel, would require the attorney to choose between violating
his obligation to preserve client confidences and violating Rule
10b-5.
A further issue arises from the SEC's position that attorneys
have duties running to investors as well as to their clients. Canon 5
of the ABA Code provides that the lawyer's duties and. loyalties
should run to the client. 163 However, Canon 7 contains the offset-
ting consideration that "[a] lawyer should represent a client zeal-
ously within the bounds of the law. "164 Ethical Consideration 7-5
further reveals the advisor-advocate dual role:
A lawyer as adviser furthers the interest of his client by
giving his professional opinion as to what he believes
would likely be the ultimate decision of the courts on the
matter at hand and by informing his client of the practical
effect of such decision. He may continue in the representa-
tion of his client even though his client has elected to
pursue a course of conduct contrary to the advice of the
lawyer so long as he does not thereby knowingly assist the
163 Ethical Consideration 5-1, ABA Code, EC 5-1, states:
The professional judgment of a lawyer should be exercised, within the bounds
of the law, solely for the benefit of his client and free of compromising influences and
loyalties. Neither his personal interests, the interests of other clients, nor the desires
of third persons should be permitted to dilute his loyalty to his client.
A relevant consideration supporting this rule appears in a note citing Grievance Comm. v.
Rattner, 152 Conn. 59, 203 A.2d 82 (1964), to the effect that "[w]hen a client engages the
services of a lawyer in a given piece of business he is entitled to feel that, until that business is
finally disposed of in some manner, he has the undivided loyalty of the one upon whom he
looks as his advocate and his champion. .. ." Id. at 65, 203 A.21 at 84. See also ABA Code,
DR 5-105, & DR 5-107.
164
 ABA Code, Canon No. 7 (emphasis added). Disciplinary Rule 7-101, ABA Code, DR
7-101, prohibits a lawyer from "intentionally" failing to "seek the lawful objectives of his
client through reasonably available means," and Disciplinary Rule 7-102, ABA Code DR
7-102, prohibits a lawyer from counselling or assisting "his client in conduct that the lawyer
knows to be illegal or fraudulent." This is repeated in Ethical Consideration 7-1, ABA Code,
EC 7-!, which states:
The duty of a lawyer, both to his client and to the legal system, is to represent his
client zealously within the bounds of the law, which includes Disciplinary Rules and
enforceable professional regulations. The professional responsibility of a lawyer
derives from his membership in a profession which has the duty of assisting mem-
bers of the public to secure and protect available legal rights and benefits.
Ethical Consideration 7-3, ABA Code, EC 7-3, adds:
Where the bounds of law are uncertain, the action of a lawyer may depend on
whether he is serving as advocate or adviser. A lawyer may serve simultaneously as
both advocate and adviser, but the two roles are essentially different. In asserting a
position on behalf of his client, an advocate for the most part deals with past
conduct and must take the facts as he finds them. By contrast, a lawyer serving as
adviser primarily assists his client in determining the course of future conduct and
relationships. While serving as advocate, a lawyer should resolve in favor of his
client doubts as to the bounds of the law. In serving a client as adviser, a lawyer in
appropriate circumstances should give his professional opinion as to what the ulti-
mate decisions of the courts would likely be as to the applicable law.
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client to engage in illegal conduct or to take a frivolous
legal position. A lawyer should never encourage or aid his
client to commit criminal acts or counsel his client on how
to violate the law and avoid punishment therefor. 165
Therefore, under the ABA Code an attorney cannot assist a
client in illegal conduct, and if such conduct is to be engaged in by
the client, the lawyer should disclose this and may discharge the
client.
C. Liability as an Aider and Abettor
The Commission and private litigants have sought to impose
obligations under the securities laws upon an everwidening circle of
participants. For instance, a consent decree has been entered against
a public relations firm which agreed to investigate the information it
publicizes on behalf of its clients.' 66
 The Commission has also
censured a bank for "willfully" violating the antifraud provisions
and aiding and abetting violations through sales of unregistered
securities on behalf of an account maintained at the bank. 167 Al-
though the bank was not aware of the violation, the Commission
reasoned that banks should take precautions similar to those taken
by brokers to avoid misuse of such accounts.'" For the first time,
the Commission has acted against bond counsel in a financing
arrangement similar to an industrial development bond offering,I 69
as well as against the underwriter, the company and their princi-
pals.'" The order against the bond counsel in proceedings pursuant
to Rule 2(e) 17 ' of the Commission's Rules of Practice states the
Commission's view that the counsel had inter alia a previous rela-
tionship with the developer involved and "should have known, if he
did not know" of material omissions in the disclosure documents for
the offering. 172
 The settlement offer of the counsel included adop-
tion of certain investigatory procedures.'",
15 ' ABA Code, EC 7-5 (emphasis added). See also Disciplinary Rule 2-110(C), ABA
Code, DR 2-110(C), which permits, but does not require, withdrawal &Om representation
where a client "seeks to pursue an illegal course of conduct," ABA Code, DR 2-110(C)(1)(b),
or "insists" that the attorney pursue such course. ABA Code, DR 2-110(C)(1)(c).
155
 SEC v. Pig 'N Whistle Corp., [1971-72 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
93,384, at 91969.3 (N,D, Ill. 1972),
167
 Southern Cal. First Nat'l Bank, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9289,
reprinted in [1970-71 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 11 78,204, at 80593 (Aug. 16,
1971).
1" Id. at 80594.
1" Jo M. Ferguson, SEC Securities Act Release No, 5523 (Aug, 21, 1974). See SEC v.
R,J. Allen & Associates, Inc., Civil No. 74-1273-Civ-CF (S.D. Fla., Dec. 1974); SEC Litiga-
tion Release No. 5656 (Dec. 27, 1974).
17 ° SEC v. Senex Corp., Civil No. 74-53 (E.D. Ky., filed July 24, 1974).
171
 SEC Rule 2(e), 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e) (19,74).
172
 SEC v. Senex Corp., Civil No. 74-53 (E.D. Ky., filed July 24, 1974).
I" The firm agreed to the following procedures in the decree:
429
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
The question of potential liability of counsel in exempt offer-
ings due to failure to discharge obligations under the antifraud
provisions of the federal securities laws is therefore a highly relevant
and timely issue. The settlement offer described above"" recognizes
a duty of bond counsel to the investors, and indeed evidences a
recognition by counsel that it represents the investors. However, it
is interesting to note that any investigation required of bond counsel
as a result of the settlement offer is much more like that necessary to
avoid liability under a gross negligence than under a negligence
standard. The investigation consists of obtaining audited financial
statements, investigation of the background of the parties to the
transaction and obtaining assurances of the parties and counsel to
the company as to completeness of information in the official state-
ment.'"
1. Private Actions and Commission Enforcement Actions
In a comprehensive and careful analysis of the elements of
aiding and abetting, •Professor Ruder lists the elements as (1) an
independent wrong by the primary violator, (2) "knowledge" by the
defendant of the wrong and (3) assistance by the defendant to the
wrongdoer in the completion of the wrong after such knowledge.' 76
The "knowledge" requirement may be satisfied by a reckless refusal
to consider and investigate facts indicating the wrong.' 77
Indeed, the rapidly developing law in this area is tending
toward the establishment of a duty to investigate under certain
(1) Every two weeks, members of the firm meet and discuss all of their active
cases. Affirmative approval of each partner is required before the issuance of any
legal opinion. (2) The firm will undertake an appropriate investigation in connection
with acting as bond counsel including, among other things, obtaining independently-
audited financial statements and inquiring into the background of the various parties
connected with the offering. Written evidence of such investigations and the results
thereof will be reviewed by the partners of the firm. (3) An appropriate "engagement
letter" will be sent to all interested parties, emphasizing that the firm's duty is to the
issuer and the bondholders. It will define the scope of the firm's work as bond
counsel and required submission to it of certain pertinent•information. (4) The firm
will require that it receive independently-audited financial statements, representa-
tions from appropriate interested persons concerning the accuracy and completeness
of the statements about them in any offering circulars, and a statement from counsel
for any lessee or guarantor that such counsel has reviewed the offering circular and is
aware of no inaccuracies therein. (5) Partners and associates of the firm will attend,
at least annually, municipal bond workshops and seminars.
Id.
174
 See note 173 supra.
175 See note 173 supra.
' 76
 Ruder, Multiple Defendants in Securities Law Fraud Cases: Aiding and Abetting,
Conspiracy, In Pari Delicto, Indemnification, and Contribution, 120 U. Pa. L. Rev. 597,
620-38 (1972),
177
 Id. at 634
-35, 638. See Johnson, The Expanding Responsibilities of Attorneys in
Practice Before the SEC: Disciplinary Proceedings Under Rule 2(e) of the Commission's Rules
of Practice, 25 Mercer L. Rev. 637, 660 (1974).
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circumstances even where there is no indication of an independent
wrong. Such a duty, for instance, may be imposed upon accountants
certifying financial statements if they wish to avoid aider and abet-
tor status.'" The result is a weakening of both the knowledge and
assistance requirements so that even a negligent failure to investi-
gate information which one has a duty to investigate could satisfy
both requirements.
However, a strict reading of the requirements of an aider and
abettor violation may be excessively narrow. Despite Professor
Ruder's careful analysis, the court in SEC v. Spectrum, Ltd. 179
would make it easier for the Commission to establish a violation on
the part of attorneys. The court rejected the position that knowledge
or a reckless refusal to view the facts is required to establish a
violation by counsel rendering certain opinions.'" Although the
conflicting evidence in the case could show actual knowledge or
recklessness on the part of the defendant attorney regarding the
failure of the issuer to comply with the registration requirements of
the Securities Act, the court apparently sought to establish a duty of
investigation for attorneys issuing opinions similar to that which
may exist for accountants certifying financial statements. According
to the court, a negligent failure to investigate the facts supporting an
opinion for the sale of the securities without registration could give
rise to an injunctive remedy. in a Commission enforcement action."'
In a statement indicating a more extreme position, the court in
Black & Co. v. Nova -Tech, Inc. 182 held that under the Oregon
securities laws,
Ian attorney] need not have actual knowledge of an illegal
securities transaction in order Co become a "participant" in
such sale. The fact that [the attorney] did not know, and
could not have known, of the illegal quality of a securities
179
 See Hochfelder v. Ernst & Ernst, 503 F.2d 1100 (7th Cir, 1974); Ruder, Aiding and
Abetting, 7 Rev. Sec. Reg. 882 (1974); News & Comment, Seventh Circuit Applies "Flexible"
Duty Standard to Auditors Charged with Aiding and Abetting Fraud, BNA Sec. Reg. & L.
Rep,, Sept. 11, 1974, at A-8.
174
	 F.2d 535 (2d Cir, 1973).
1 " Id. at 541.
"11 Id.
In the distribution of unregistered securities, the preparation of an opinion letter is
too essential and the reliance of the public too high to permit due•diligence to be cast
aside in the name of convenience. The public trust demands more of its legal
advisers than "customary" activities which prove to be careless. And, . . . where
expediency precludes thorough investigation, an attorney can prevent the illicit use
of his opinion letter by prohibiting its utilization in the sale of unregistered securities
by a statement to that effect clearly appearing on the face of the letter.
Id. at 542.
182 333 F. Supp. 468 (D. Ore. 1971).
431
BOSTON COLT EGB INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
transaction, while relevant to the issue of his liability, is
not relevant to the issue of his participation. 183
In effect, such a position would turn the attorney participating in a
securities transaction into a policeman.'" The Commission has
stated its view of what it considers to be the attorney's policing
function in Emanuel Fields, 185 where the Commission referred to
"the peculiarly strategic and especially central place of the private
practicing lawyer in the investment process and in the enforcement
of the body of federal law aimed at keeping that process fair . »186
and added: "Members of this Commission have pointed out time
and time again that the task of enforcing the securities laws rests in
overwhelming measure on the bar's shoulders."' 87 The Chairman of
183 Id. at 472. This is similar to the Spectrum court's view. See note 184 infra.
"4 "The securities laws provide a myriad of safeguards designed to protect the interests
of the investing public. Effective implementation of these safeguards, however, depends in
large measure on the members of the bar who serve in an advisory capacity to those engaged
in securities transactions." 489 F.2d at 536. See also Johnson, supra note 177, at 667.
I" SEC Securities Act Release No. 5404, reprinted in [1973 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. 9 79,407, at 83172 (June 18, 1973).
ush Id. at 83175 n.20.
I " Id. The Commission continued:
These were statements of what all who are versed in the practicalities of securities
law know to be a truism, i.e., that this Commission with its small staff, limited
resources, and onerous tasks is peculiarly dependent on the probity and the diligence
of the professionals who practice before it. Very little of a securities lawyer's work is
adversary in character. He doesn't work in courtrooms where the pressure of vigilant
adversaries and alert judges checks him. He works in his office where he prepares
prospectuses, proxy statements, opinions of counsel, and other documents that we,
our staff, the financial community, and the investing public must take on faith. This
is a field where unscrupulous lawyers can inflict irreparable harm on those who rely
on the disclosure documents that they produce. Hence we are under a duty to hold
our bar to appropriately rigorous standards of professional honor.
Id. See Distribution By Broker-Dealers of Unregistered Securities, SEC Securities Act Release
No. 4445, reprinted in 2 CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 111 22,753, at 16625 (Feb. 2, 1962).
[The] practice of responsible counsel not to furnish an opinion concerning the
availability of an exemption from registration under the Securities Act for a con-
templated distribution unless such counsel have themselves carefully examined all of
the relevant circumstances and satisfied themselves, to the extent possible, that the
contemplated transaction is, in fact, not a part of an unlawful distribution. Indeed,
if an attorney furnishes an opinion based solely upon hypothetical facts which he has
made no effort to verify, and if he knows that his opinion will be relied upon as the
basis for a substantial distribution of unregistered securities, a serious question arises
as to the propriety of his professional conduct.
Id. (emphasis added). In American Fin. Co., 40 S.E.C. 1043 (1962), the Commission had
indicated a more traditional view: "Though owing a public responsibility, an attorney in
acting as the client's adviser, defender, advocate and confidant enters into a personal relation-
ship in which his principal concern is with the interests and rights of his client. Id. at 1049
(emphasis added). This was contrasted with the role of the accountant: "The requirement of
the [Securities] Act of certification by an independent accountant, on the other hand, is
intended to secure for the benefit of public investors the detached objectivity of a disinterested
person." Id. at 1049. See also Cohen, The Lawyer's Role in Securities Regulation, 24 Bus.
Law. 305, 307 (1968); Cooney, The Implications of the Revolution in Securities Regulation for
Lawyers, 29 Bus, Law. 129, 130, 132-34 (Special Issue, Mar. 1974).
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the SEC has referred to the Commission's desire to "rely on a small
government police force" and that to do so it "must keep the
pressure on the professionals to do a major part of the job—the
protection of investors." 88
Taken literally, these views could impose a serious degree of
liability upon legal practitioners for what are, in the context of a
lengthy, complex and very difficult representation, relatively minor
errors or lapses of judgment. Burdens of this nature are serious
enough when placed upon the underwriters. Requiring secondary
participants to duplicate the efforts of the primary participants
seems unnecessary and would add little actual investor protection.
These somewhat idealistic positions demand a degree of perfection
which is very difficult to achieve, particularly since administrative
and judicial judgments are made with hindsight and by viewing the
particular errors in isolation from the context of the entire transac-
tion. These positions would seem likely to have the unfortunate
result of instilling such a degree ofi cautionin counsel as to lengthen
considerably and to add uneconomically to the expenses of the
process of raising capital by small and new companies.'" One may
question whether such a result meshes with national economic
policies of encouraging competition and new ventures through the
antitrust laws' 9° and whether such developments were intended by
Congress in adopting the federal securities laws.
Certainly the ABA Code does not carry responsibilities of at-
torneys to the public nearly so far as do the more recent Commission
and judicial pronouncements. Indeed, the ABA Code's emphasis
upon protecting confidences and secrets of clients and giving clients
undivided loyalty in legal representation's' places obligations upon
attorneys directly counter to those which the Commission and the
11411
 Garrett, New Directions in Professional Responsibility, 29 Bus. Law. 7, 10 (Special
Issue, Mar. 1974).
"9
 In most cases, the alleged aider and abettor . .
	 will merely be engaging in
customary business activities, such as . . . giving legal advice. If [the attorney] will
be required to investigate the ultimate activities of the party whom he is assisting, a
burden may be imposed upon business activities that is too great. Although such a
duty might contribute to the protection of investors by creating another level of
private investigators, creation of such a duty through use of aiding and abetting ...
should take place only through the sound foundation of judicial precedent in analo-
gous fields or express statutory language.
Ruder, supra note 176, at 632-33. Another commentator has suggested that requiring the bar
to become an enforcement arm of the securities laws would reduce them to "one-armed
sheriffs" because "sophisticated clients would quickly develop a system. of , . arcane
disclosure to the lawyer" and the lawyer would frame answers to his client's questions in
terms of his personal safety. Cooney, supra note 187, at 133. See also the excellent discussion
in Messer, supra note 139, at 446-58,
' 9" See generally 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-33 (1970).
141
 See text at notes 148-65 supra.
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Spectrum court seem to envision in situations not clearly involving
fraud arising in the course of the representation or intended future
violations of the law. 192
A more moderate, albeit indefinite, position than that stated by
the Spectrum court and the Commission was taken by the court in
SEC v. Frank. 193 There, the Commission brought an action against
an attorney for alleged violations of the antifraud provisions and
obtained an injunction in the lower court.' 94 The alleged violations
involved statements in disclosure documents concerning chemical
processes and related tests and reports. The attorney took the posi-
tion that he had no knowledge of the misrepresentations and had
merely been a "scrivener" and attempted to place "in proper form"
the position of the issuer's management as to the information. In
remanding for a hearing to resolve issues of conflicting evidence, the
court stated:
EN lawyer, no more than others, can escape liability for
fraud by closing his eyes to what he saw and could readily
understand . . . . Whether the fraud sections of the se-
curities laws go beyond this and require a lawyer passing
on an offering circular to run down possible infirmities in
his client's story of which he has been put on notice, and if
so what efforts are required of him, is a closer question on
which it is important that the court be seized of the precise
facts, including the extent, as the SEC claimed with re-
spect to Frank, to which his role went beyond a lawyer's
normal one . . . 195
192
 ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Opinions, No. 335 (1974) concludes, in issuing
opinions on exemptions from the registration requirements for offers and sales of securities:
[A] lawyer should make adequate preparation including inquiry into the relevant
facts . . ., and while he should not accept as true that which he should not
reasonably believe to be true, he does not have the responsibility to "audit" the
affairs of his client or to assume, without reasonable cause, that a client's statement
of the facts cannot be relied upon.
Id. See also ABA Phase I Report, supra note 158, at 12-14, 17-19.
193
 388 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1968).
194 Id. at 487.
195
 Id. at 489. The court continued:
A lawyer has no privilege to assist in circulating a statement with regard to securities
which he knows to be false simply because his client has furnished it to him. At the
other extreme it would be unreasonable to hold a lawyer who was putting his client's
description of a chemical process into understandable English to be guilty of fraud
simply because of his failure to detect discrepancies between their description and
technical reports available to him in a physical sense but beyond his ability to
understand. The instant case lies between these extremes.
Id. One commentator observes:
In a very critical sense, [the attorney] is involved as the "first line of enforcement" in
this facet of his craft. He can no longer take comfort as the "mere" scriviner. He
must have a clear understanding of his role in this regard. . . [Als an investigator
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Additional indications of developing responsibilities of se-
curities attorneys are less certain. One of these appears in Escott v.
BarChris Construction Corp., 196 in which the court concluded that
attorneys were not liable as "experts" for the purposes of section 11
of the Securities Act in connection with the preparation of a registra-
tion statement.' 97
 However, the court further concluded that an
attorney who was also a director of the corporation and who par-
ticipated in writing the registration statement was required to en-
gage in a degree of investigation greater than that required of a
director not connected with this work.' 98 In Blakely v. Lisac, 199 a
number of defendants, including a director of the issuer who was
also an attorney, were sued for violations of the antifraud provi-
sions. After noting a number of misstatements and omissions in the
prospectus, the court held one defendant liable "both as a lawyer
and as a director" for "misleading financial information in the pros-
pectus which he should have investigated" in preparing the prospec-
tus for the issuer.'" The attorney was found liable to stockholders
who purchased in reliance on the prospectus and the reports, and
was also required to account for profits from his own sale of stock of
the issuer. 20 '
In an action which has implications for the theory of aider and
abettor liability in exempt offerings, the Commission filed a highly
controversial complaint in SEC v. National Student Marketing
Corp. 202 Many of the duties which may be imposed upon counsel in
into the factual data, and as the sculptor of the written product, the. cases have
turned this aspect of the practice into an adversary process, involving attorneys and
accountants on one side (though not always), and the issuer on the other, with the
battle lines capable of shifting on occasion, and counsel mandated to be an advocate
for the public "interest."
Johnson, supra note 177, at 664.
196 283 F. Supp. 643 (S,D.N.Y. 1968).
17 Id. at 683.
19°
	 at 690. A similar position was taken in Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip.
Corp., 332 F. Supp, 544, 575-79 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
1" 357 F. Supp. 255 (D. Ore. 1972).
"0 Id. at 266. After stating that the attorney (Gygi) was also a director, the opinion
concluded:
[Gygi] relies on a statement by the plaintiffs that he is being sued as an attorney and
not as a director. I am not bound by such statement, and I find that he is liable both
as a lawyer and as a director.
Both as an attorney and as a director, Gygi knew or should have known of the
misleading financial information in the prospectus which he should have investi-
gated. Here Gygi's role was "beyond a lawyer's normal one," and he is held to even a
higher standard of care. . . .
Gygi is also liable for the errors in the March 20 Report and the Annual Report.
He, more than any other defendant, knew the importance of carefully investigating
the validity of the statements in these reports.
Id. at 266-67 (emphasis added). See text at notes 193-95 supra.
291 357 F. Supp. at 267.
Civil No. 225-72 (D.D.C., filed Feb, 3, 1972), complaint reprinted in [1971-72
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exempt offerings under the expanding and developing law may have
their roots in this complaint. In the complaint, the Commission
requested injunctive action against certain attorneys and prominent
law firms, charging that they violated and aided and abetted viola-
tions203
 of certain provisions, including the antifraud sections, of the
federal securities laws.
A brief review of the most important allegations of facts will
assist in analyzing the complaint and its bearing on obligations of
counsel. The central allegations concern a merger involving Na-
tional Student Marketing Corporation (NSMC). The Commission
alleged that proxy material, mailed to the shareholders of the merg-
ing corporation and the NSMC shareholders prior to the vote ap-
proving the merger included financial statements of NSMC reflect-
ing an income of $700,000 on an unaudited basis for a nine month
period which ended only a few months prior to the vote. The merger
agreement included in the proxy material required, as a condition to
closing, a "cold comfort" letter from the accountants to NSMC as to
the unaudited financial statements. The cold comfort letter was to
state that the accountants had no reason to believe that the unau-
dited financial statements had not been prepared in accordance with
generally accepted accounting principles or required material ad-
justments to fairly present the results of operations of NSMC for the
nine month period and further that NSMC had suffered no material
adverse change from the end of the unaudited period until five
business days prior to the merger. The proxy material indicated that
conditions placed upon the merger also included the delivery of
opinions of counsel to NSMC and counsel to the merging corpora-
tion stating satisfaction of all other conditions to closing and com-
pliance with federal and state securities laws. The merger agreement
permitted waivers of conditions to closing.
At the closing, the accountants, after some confusion, delivered
a qualified cold comfort letter disclosing that adjustments in the
unaudited financial statements would be necessary. The accountants
also disclosed to NSMC and its counsel (but not to the others
present at the closing) that, if the adjustments were made, a net loss
would be reflected for the nine month period and a "break-even"
would be reflected for the year ended August 31, 1969. Neverthe-
less, counsel to NSMC delivered the required approving opinion, as
did counsel to the merging corporation. Other controversial opinions
and actions by the attorneys are alleged. .
Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 	 93,360, at 91913 (1972). See SEC v. National
Student Mktg. Corp., 360 F. Supp. 284, 287-90 (D.D.C. 1973).
a° 3
 The bases of aider and abettor liability are described in Ruder, supra note 176, at
620-38.
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According to the Commission, proceeding with the closing
without disclosure of the information in the cold comfort letter to
the public, to the shareholders of NSMC, or to the merging corpora-
tion, was a "fraudulent scheme" because the "defendants knew
shareholder approval of the merger had been obtained on the ba-
sis of materially false and misleading financial statements of
NSMC . . . . "2"4 The Commission further contended that "[als part
of the fraudulent scheme" the attorneys and firms "failed to refuse to
issue their opinions . . and failed to insist that the financial
statements be revised and shareholders be resolicited, and failing
that, to cease representing their respective clients and, under the
circumstances, notify the plaintiff Commission concerning the mis-
leading nature of the nine month financial statements." 205
The novelty of the complaint lies in the fact that prestigious law
firms previously have not been the subject of such action by the
Commission. An analysis of the alleged facts (assuming the truth of
the allegations and viewing only those allegations) leads to the
conclusion that there is a substantial possibility that the Commission
is correct. NSMC and counsel had been involved in a very large
number of mergers over a short period of time and such transactions
frequently tend to require unanticipated last minute judgments of a
complex nature. 206 Nevertheless, it does not seem that any serious
question can be raised as to the "materiality" of the errors in the
unaudited financial statements disclosed in the cold comfort let-
ter. 207
 Furthermore, the accountants had caused counsel to focus
204 [1971-72 'Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 11 93,360 at 91913-16.
ens
	 at 91913-17.
2" See Johnson, supra note 177, at 655.
21" The materiality of the nondisclosure appears sufficiently obvious so that the intent
necessary for commission of a crime might be found. If that is the case, the requirements of
preservation of confidentiality of information relevant to that intent would not exist by virtue
of Disciplinary Rule 4-101(C), ABA Code, DR 4-101(C). Permission to disclose the informa-
tion would thus exist. Additionally, Ethical Consideration 7-5, ABA Code, EC 7-5, recom-
mends withdrawal by the attorneys from the matter and Disciplinary Rule 7-102(B), ABA
Code, DR 7-102(B), and ABA Opinion 314, supra note 155, require disclosure of the fraud to
the shareholders of the merging corporation. See Meyerhofer v. Empire Fire & Marine Ins.
Co., 497 F.2d 1190 (2d Cir. 1974) (an attorney was held to have acted in compliance with
Disciplinary Rule 4-101(C) by disclosing facts surrounding possible violations of the Securities
Act to defend himself. Id. at 1195. The disclosures were made to plaintiffs' counsel in an
action brought by private litigants against a number of parties, including the attorney. Prior
disclosure had been made to the Commission.). But see Karmel, Attorneys' Securities Laws
Liabilities, 27 Bus. Law. 1153, 1162 (1972). Where the materiality of an omission or mis-
statement is not sufficiently clear to entail criminal intent on the part of the client, the
information would be privileged and disclosure would be forbidden by the ABA Code.
Furthermore, it would appear that there is a substantial possibility that thë individual
attorneys participating in the matter did in fact aid and abet violations of the securities laws.
Based upon such an analysis, there is no substantial conflict between the position of the
Commission and the ABA Code on these matters. On the other hand, the SEC apparently
feels that where criminal intent on the part of the client is absent but civil liability may be
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sharply on, and to discuss, the particular figures in the financials. 208
National Student Marketing does not involve a failure to recognize
the importance of a figure buried in a mass of other material. Unless
the misstatements were corrected, it seems inevitable that fraud had
been or would have been committed. This appears to be a knowl-
edge or gross negligence level of culpability rather than simply a
negligence level.
Although the formulation of a legal opinion does not necessarily
entail a duty of investigation by attorneys similar to that apparently
developing for accountants, all three elements of an aider and abet-
tor violation209 appear present in the facts alleged in the National
Student Marketing Complaint.n° There was an independent wrong,
the defendants can be said to have "known" of the independent
wrong and the defendants issued their opinions and took other
actions which assisted in furthering that wrong. 2 "
It can be seen that attorneys as yet have no clear duty to
investors at - a negligence level, as opposed to a gross negligence
level, for investigation and verification of information used in dis-
closure documents they prepare or used in transactions in which
they participate. Nevertheless, there is sufficient developing prece-
dent for counsel to proceed with considerable caution in an exempt
offering, unless there is a reasonable assurance that someone is
conducting such an investigation on behalf of the company and the
underwriters. Such caution is necessary even if it is assumed that
knowledge or recklessness is the appropriate level of culpability.
Applying the analysis used respecting the National Student
Marketing facts to the circumstances frequently surrounding the
involvement of counsel in an exempt offering, a serious question
arises as to the aider and abettor status of counsel. It is clear that
there is an independent violation by the underwriters where no
investigation or an inadequate investigation of the material con-
tained in the disclosure documents is made. The question of the
knowledge or recklessness of the counsel is more complicated. In
many cases, counsel is involved in numerous transactions involving
the same underwriter. Over the course of time, it would seem
inevitable that serious misrepresentations and omissions would be
imposed, the attorney is still subject to liability for nondisclosure as an aider and abettor. It
seems unlikely that the ABA Code and its policies would prevail in a conflict with the federal
securities laws and the policies supporting them.
20
 In the trial of officers and accountants of NSMC completed in November 1974 in the
Southern District of New York, convictions resulted on a number of counts. Wall Street
Journal, Nov. 15, 1974, at 8, col. 2.
2"
 See text at note 176 supra.
2 ")
 See Freeman, supra note 161, at 426, 429-31.
21t
	 id. at 424-25.
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made on a repeated basis in many of these offerings. Counsel may
not be aware of any particular misrepresentation or omission in any
particular transaction. However, it would not seem necessary that
counsel have such specific knowledge to be in violation as an aider
and abettor. Rather, knowledge that the underwriter failed to inves-
tigate and verify information and the inevitability of the conse-
quences of that failure would seem to be sufficient scienter, and
certainly a sufficient degree of recklessness, to satisfy the "knowl-
edge" requirement for an aider and abbettor violation. 212
The third element of the violation213 consists of taking action
which assists in the consummation of the violation. Counsel may
not, and bond counsel does not, advise the underwriters on all
securities law matters except in circumstances where the employ-
ment is specifically directed to that end. Nevertheless, coun-
sel furthers the violation by participating in the transaction and
bond counsel does so by issuing its opinion as to tax consequences
and validity of the issuance of the bonds. This would seem sufficient
to meet the "assistance" element. A requirement that counsel actu-
ally participate in the preparation of inaccurate or insufficient dis-
closure documents to be connected with a securities law violation
would be overly technical where , counsel significantly assists in
completing the transaction in other ways. Accordingly it must be
concluded that counsel participating in an exempt transaction, with
knowledge or clear notice that the underwriter is violating its obliga-
tion by not conducting a sufficient investigation of the material in
the disclosure documents, would itself be subject to liability and
penalties as an aider and abettor of the underwriter's violation.
Counsel should at least be satisfied that: (1) the company and
the underwriters understand their obligations under the securities
laws, including their investigatory obligations; (2) the company and
the underwriters are attempting in good faith to satisfy those obliga-
tions (including obtaining advice from experienced securities attor-
neys); and (3) counsel itself has no notice of material misstatements
or omissions in the disclosure documents or any other securities law
violations in connection with the transaction. These conclusions are
consistent with the procedures established by bond counsel in the
consent decree in Jo M. Ferguson, 214 and should protect counsel
from liability as an aider and abettor. However, they also require a
drastic change in the procedures currently utilized in many exempt
offerings.
212 See text at note 176 supra.
213 See text at note 176 supra.
214 SEC Securities Act Release No. 5523 (Aug. 21, 1974). Sec text at note 169 supra.
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2. SEC Disciplinary Proceedings
The concomitants of liability or of injunctive action in a Com-
mission enforcement proceeding are not the only risks to which
counsel are subject as a result of securities law violations. Under
Rule 2(e) of the Commission's Rules of Practice, 215 if the Commis-
sion finds a violation of the securities laws, it may temporarily or
permanently deny to any person, including attorneys, the "privilege"
of appearing or practicing before it. 2 ' 6 The violation of the securities
laws, rules or regulations must be "willful" or the person must have
"willfully aided and abetted" the violation. 217 As noted previous-
ly, 218 the term "willful" has been used in disciplinary proceedings in
a very broad sense to include a failure to conduct an investigation of
information in disclosure documents as opposed to knowledge of the
falsity or insufficiency of information or any other evidence of "evil
motive. " 21 9
Under the Rule, the Commission may also temporarily suspend
from practice before it attorneys (1) subject to permanent court
injunctions in connection with suits initiated by the SEC 22 ° or (2)
who are otherwise found by a court or by the Commission to have
violated willfully or aided and abetted the violation of the securities
laws. 22 ' The temporary suspension will become permanent after the
elapse of 30 days if a petition is not filed by the attorney or, if a
petition is filed and the Commission decides against the attorney, he
may be "censure[d] .. . or disqualified] from appearing or practic-
ing before the Commission for a period of time or permanently. "222
The procedures which the Commission has recently created for
hearings223
 under the rule place an attorney at a severe disadvan-
tage. 224
 In effect, through reliance upon an injunctive proceeding,
the Commission can "place the [attorney] in a position of proving
215 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e) (1974). See generally Comment, SEC Disciplinary Rules and the
Federal Securities Laws: The Regulation, Role and Responsibilities of the Attorney, 1972
Duke L.J. 969.
21.3
 The term "practicing" is defined in SEC Rule 2(g), 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(g) (1974), to
include, but not to be limited to, "(1) transacting any business with the Commission; and (2)
the preparation of any statement, opinion - or other paper by any attorney . . filed with the
Commission in any registration statement, notification, application, report or other document
with the consent of such attorney . . . ." Id.
2"
 SEC Rule 2(e)(1)(iii), 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e)(1)(iii) (1974).
219
	 text at notes 113-21 supra.
219
 See Johnson, supra note 177, at 643-44; Ruder, supra note 176, at 636-37.
220 SEC Rule 2(e)(3)(i)(a), 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e)(3)(i)(a) (1974).
22 ' SEC Rule 2(e)(3)(i)(b), 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e)(3)(i)(b) (1974).
222 SEC Rule 2(e)(3)(iii), 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e)(3)(iii) (1974).
223 SEC Rules 2(e)(3)-26, 17 C.F.R. §§ 201.2(e)(3)-.26 (1974).
2 " See Comment, supra note 213, at 994-1022. Such procedures appear to be an
attempt to avoid the adverse effects of a reversal of previous disciplinary action against an
attorney on the grounds that improper evidence as to misconduct had been considered. Cf.
Kivitz v. SEC, 475 F,2d 956, 960, 962 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Johnson, supra note 177, at 645-47.
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that he should not have his license taken away from him" while
preventing him from relitigating the facts underlying the injunction
or other determination. 225 Of course, the settling of injunctive ac-
tions through consent decrees, a common practice in which the
defendant is subjected to a remedy without admitting or denying the
allegations against him, has now become a very risky alternative.
Additionally, the Commission has proposed to amend the rule to
provide that it may, on its own motion, hold nonpublic hearings. 226
Although appearance or practice before the Commission does
not usually occur in an exempt offering, violations giving rise to
discipline may arise from such an offering and affect counsel's
ability to handle securities matters which do involve appearance or
practice.
D. Liability for Malpractice
In some cases counsel, pursuant to a specific agreement of
employment with the underwriter, undertakes an investigation of the
information in the disclosure documents to provide some check as to
the accuracy and sufficiency of that information. In agreeing to
prepare disclosure documents and perform portions of the investiga-
tion, counsel should also exercise care to prevent misunderstandings
as to the nature of the employment. Counsel employed to conduct
such an investigation should carefully review with the underwriter
the particular aspects of the investigation to be conducted by coun-
sel. 227
Such a review can serve two purposes. First, it would carefully
and specifically delineate the nature of the investigation to be under-
taken by counsel much in the same fashion as the particular matters
investigated by accountants are limited in cold comfort letters. This
would prevent any misconceptions by the underwriter as to the
particular matters to be investigated and the procedures to be fol-
lowed by counsel. Second, the review would ensure that the under-
writers would focus upon the remaining investigatory procedures
which would not be completed by counsel so that the underwriters
may protect themselves from liability and avoid aider and abettor
liability of counsel. This is particularly important since the under-
writers are better equipped than are the attorneys to conduct certain
procedures, such as investigating information of a predominantly
financial nature. If the underwriters rely upon counsel for the per-
formance of "nonlegal" activities, they must realize- the conse-
225 Johnson, supra note 177, at 656.
226 See generally id. at 637-69. But see Securities Act Release No. 5572 (Mar. 4, 1975).
227
 See Small, An Attorney's Responsibilities Under Federal and State Securities Laws:
. Private Counselor or Public Servant?, 61 Calif. L. Rev. 1189, 1209 (1973),
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quences of the creation of this agency relationship. According to
BarChris, the underwriters must accept responsibility for any in-
adequacy in the investigation by their agents, including legal coun-
se1. 228
However, once counsel has been employed to conduct those
aspects of the investigation which can adequately be conducted by
legal counsel, there arise certain duties which must be fulfilled to
perform those activities in a competent manner. Some of these
duties are professional obligations arising under the ABA Code. 229
Apart from the ethical issues, liability to the client may be incurred
at common law if the representation by the attorney is performed
negligently. 230
 However, the securities laws are extremely complex
and involve many difficult judgments. Thus, a relevant considera-
tion is the standard to which the attorney will be held.
In Lucas v. Hamm, 231 the test applied to an attorney in a case
involving alleged negligence in drafting a will was that of the "skill,
prudence, and diligence [which] lawyers of ordinary skill and capac-
ity commonly possess and exercise in •the performance of the tasks
which they undertake." 232 The court remarked:
The attorney is not liable for every mistake he may
make in his practice; he is not, in the absence of an express
agreement, an insurer of the soundness of his opinions or
of the validity of an instrument that he is engaged to draft;
and he is not liable for being in error as to a question of
law on which reasonable doubt may be entertained by
well-informed lawyers. 233
In Lucas, the court refused to impose liability upon an attorney for a
mistake in applying abstruse rules relating to the devolution of
property. 234
 According to the court, the rules were sufficiently
difficult that the average attorney exercising ordinary care could
have made a similar mistake. If, however, counsel holds itself out
223
 283 F. Supp. at 697. See text at notes 196-98 supra.
229
 ABA Code, Canon No. 6 provides that Nal lawyer should represent a client compe-
tently." Ethical Consideration 6-1, ABA Code, EC 6-1, states: "Because of his vital role in the
legal process, a lawyer should act with competence and proper care in representing clients. He
should strive to become and remain proficient in his practice and should accept employment
only in matters which he is or intends to become competent to handle." Disciplinary Rule
6-101, ABA Code, DR 6-101, states: "A lawyer shall not: (1) Handle a legal matter which he
knows or should know that he is not competent to handle without associating with him a
lawyer who is competent to handle it. . . . (3) Neglect a legal matter entrusted to him."
230 See Small, supra note 227, at 1211.
231
 56 Cal. 2d 583, 364 P.2d 685, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821 (1961) (en bane), cert. denied, 368
U.S. 987 (1962).
232
 56 Cal. 2d at 591, 364 P.2d at 689, 15 Cal. Rptr. at 825.
233 Id.
234
 Id. at 592-93, 364 P.2d at 690, 15 Cal. Rptr. at 826.
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as having particular experience or expertise in the securities law
area, 235 it seems entirely plausible, that the applicable degree of care
would be that which would be exercised by the average' specialist
rather than that exercised by the average attorney. 236
There is another major consideration in the malpractice area.
That is the question of whether the attorney could be liable not only
to his clients, but also to investors for mistakes in the preparation of
the disclosure documents or for conducting inadequate investiga-
tions. Direct support for such a theory in the securities area is
presently lacking. However, a view of a foreseeable trend in the
development of liability under the securities laws, •as discussed in
the preceding section, 237 raises questions as to whether courts will
create such a duty. There is a developing notion that attorneys can
and do cause substantial losses to others in the course of represent-
ing their clients. 238 Harm to the specific purchasers in a particular
securities offering is reasonably foreseeable in the event of an error
in the investigation and the class, while not necessarily small, is
easily defined.
Two theories could give rise to duties of attorneys to these
purchasers. First, the investors could be considered third party
beneficiaries of the contract of employment between the underwriter
and the attorney. This basis for liability could be avoided by counsel
by explicitly providing in the contract of employment that such a
third party status is not intended. Nevertheless, the second theory of
a tort nature would not be so easy to negate. In such a case, a
255 Ethical Consideration 2-14, ABA Code, EC 2-14, and Disciplinary Rule 2-105, ABA
Code, DR 2-105, permit attorneys to hold themselves out as specialists only in very limited
situations.
236 See Henkel, Liability of Counsel for Underwriter, 24 Bus. Law. 641, 646 (1969);
Lathrop & Rinehart, Legal Malpractice and Rule 10b-5 Liability; Pitfalls for the Occasional
Securities Practitioner, 5 Loyola U.L.A.L. Rev, 449, 468 (1972).
231 See text at notes 166-214 supra.
23 ° In our complex society the accountant's certificate and the lawyer's opinion can
be instruments for inflicting pecuniary loss more potent than the chisel or the
crowbar. Of course, Congress did not mean that any mistake of law or misstatement
of fact should subject an attorney or an accountant to criminal liability simply
because more skillful practitioners would not have made them. However, Congress
equally could not have intended that men holding themselves out as members of
these ancient professions should be able to escape criminal liability on a plea of
ignorance when they have shut their eyes to what was plainly to be seen or have
represented a knowledge they knew they did not possess.
United States v. Benjamin, 328 F.2d 854, 863 (2d Cir. 1964). See text at note 194 supra. In
Heyer v. Flaig, 70 Cal. 2d 223, 449 P.2d 161, 74 Cal, Rptr. 225 (1969) (en bane), the intended
beneficiaries under a will were held to have stated a cause of action against an attorney for
negligent preparation of a will which prevented them from obtaining their intended interests.
70 Cal. 2d at 229, 449 P.2d at 165, 74 Cal. Rptr. at 229. In Lucas, the interests of the
plaintiffs were contingent, so that harm was not as readily foreseeable as in Hayes.. In both
cases, however, the class of third party plaintiffs was small and easily defined. See Small,
supra note 227, at 1195-96.
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standard of care would be established as to these readily identifiable
investors. The standard of care might be set at a negligence level,
although a gross negligence or recklessness level would seem more
appropriate considering the remote relationship of investors to the
attorney and the number and aggregate dollar amount of potential
claims. The Lucas v. Hamm 239 and Heyer v. Flaig 240 decisions
indicate, however, that a negligence standard may be applied at
least where a small number of potential claimants is involved. Both
decisions also indicate that relevant factors in establishing liability
include the following: "[T]he extent to which the transaction was
intended to affect the plaintiff, the foreseeability of harm to him, the
degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of
the connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury, and
the policy of preventing future harm."241 Two commentators have
concluded that in many offerings these factors would lead to imposi-
tion of liability on investors for negligence of attorneys rendering
legal services in the transaction. 242
The Lucas decision, however, also indicates the need to con-
sider another factor, i.e., "whether the recognition of liability ..
would impose an undue burden on the profession." 243 Undoubtedly,
extending a right of recovery to purchasers of the securities, for
negligence of counsel in preparing disclosure documents and con-
ducting an investigation, would be an extremely onerous burden.
Liability for staggering amounts would be imposed for mistakes in
collecting, reviewing, summarizing and describing massive and
complex documentary and oral information. This liability would
extend to a relatively large number of claimants, as opposed to the
smaller number of clients of the erring counsel. Such a result would
be unfortunate, unless "negligence" is defined to take into account
the realities of an offering context, with the volume and complexity
of judgments to be made and mass of material to be digested.
Indeed, the test of negligence framed in Lucas 244 appears to be
based upon a recognition of such factors. For these reasons, imposi-
tion of liability for culpable knowledge or recklessness in such
matters is easier to accept than liability for ordinary negligence.
This attitude was assumed by the court in Ultramares Corp. v.
Touche. 245 The court indicated that negligence would, because of
a" 56 Cal. 2d 583, 364 P.2d 685, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821 (1961) (en banc), cert. denied, 368
U.S. 987 (1962). See text at notes 229-34 supra.
24°
 70 Cal. 2d 223, 449 P.2d 161, 74 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1969) (en bane). See note 238 supra.
241
 56 Cal. 2d at 588, 364 P.2d at 687, 15 Cal. Rptr. at 823.
242
 Lathrop & Rinehart, supra note 236, at 466-67.
243 56 Cal. 2d at 589, 364 P.2d at 688, 15 Cal. Rptr. at 824.
244 See text at note 232 supra.
245 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931) (Cardozo,
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direct privity of contract, support a claim by a company whose
inaccurate financial statements had been certified by an accounting
firm. 246 However, knowledge or recklessness amounting to fraud
was held to be necessary if the accountants were to be liable to the
larger, indefinite class of creditors and others who dealt with the
company on the basis of the certified financial statements, even
though the accountants knew generally that the financial statements
would be used by such persons for such purposes. 247 Yet such
limitations as the Ultramares reasoning would place on liability to
persons not in direct privity with an attorney are undercut by
section 552  of the Restatement of Torts. 248 The privity argument in
the Ultramares decision has been criticized and section 552  has been
quoted approvingly in two cases in which claimants received dam-
ages for negligence of accountants. 249 While not in privity with the
accountants, the claimants in these cases had been specifically iden-
tified to the accountants as parties who would rely upon the finan-
cial information to be developed. An analogy may be drawn to
counsel's ability to identify purchasers in an offering—particularly
z46
	 at 189, 174 N.E. at 448.
247 Id.
244 Section 552 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (Tent. Draft No. 12, 1966) states:
(1) One who, in the course of his business, profession, or employment . . . supplies
false information for the guidance of others in their business transactions, is subject
to liability for pecuniary loss caused to them by their justifiable reliance upon such
information, if he fails to exercise reasonable care or competence in obtaining or
communicating the information.
(2) Except as stated in subsection (3), the liability stated in subsection (1) is limited
to loss suffered
(a) by the person or one of the persons for whose benefit and guidance he
intends to supply the information, or knows that the recipient intends to supply
it; and
(b) through reliance upon it in a transaction which he intends the information to
influence, or knows that the recipient so intends, or in a substantially similar
transaction.
(3) The liability of one who is under a public duty to give the information extends to
loss suffered by any of the class of persons for whose benefit the duty is created, in
any of the transactions in which it is intended to protect them. [Emphasis added.]
According to one commentator, § 552 establishes liability where "the maker [of the represen-
tation] knows that the information is intended for repetition to a certain group or class of
persons, and that the plaintiff proves to be one of them, even though the maker never had
heard of him when the information was given." Freeman, Opinion Letters and Profes-
sionalism, 1973 Duke L.J. 371, 383 n.47. Professor Ruder, on the other hand, believes the
drafters of § 552 were of the opinion "that when a misrepresentation is merely negligent the
actor should be liable to a narrower class of persons and for a lesser amount." Ruder, Multiple
Defendants in Securities Law Fraud Cases: Aiding and Abetting, Conspiracy, In Pani Delic-
to, Indemnification, and Contribution, 120 U. Pa. L, Rev. 597, 616 (1972).
2" Rusch Factors, Inc. v. Levin, 284 F. Supp. 85, 90-92 (D.R.I. 1968); Ryan v. Kanne,
170 N.W.2d 395, 401-03 (Iowa 1969). See Freeman, supra note 248, at 381-85. See also Fisher
v. Klctz, 266 F. Supp. 180 (S.D,N.Y. 1967). For a discussion of trends toward greater
liability of accountants, see generally Gormley, Accountants' Professional Liability—A Ten-
Year Review, 29 Bus. Law. 1205 (1974).
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in an exempt offering where the number of purchasers may be
small.
E. Liability in Connection with Delivery of Opinions
In connection with employment of counsel to conduct an inves-
tigation on behalf of the underwriters and to prepare the disclosure
documents for an exempt offering, the underwriters may desire that
a written opinion be given as to the sufficiency of the information in
the disclosure documents and to the sufficiency of the investigation.
In contrast to registered offerings, delivery of opinions touching on
these matters is not the rule for exempt offerings.
While excellent procedures for drafting opinions are avail-
able, 25° certain general points warrant emphasis. First, broad state-
ments as to the sufficiency of the information in the disclosure
documents should be avoided at all costs. It is not possible for
counsel to have more than second-hand acquaintance with the in-
formation, even after a full due diligence investigation. Any state-
ments in this regard should be limited to statements that counsel is
not "aware" of any misstatements or omissions after con-
ducting certain investigatory procedures. Second, the investigatory
procedures which were conducted should be described with spe-
cificity, and the description should eliminate any impression as to
their adequacy to discharge the entire underwriter's obligation. The
practice of making a general reference to conducting "such proce-
dures as we deemed adequate in the circumstances" entails increas-
ingly greater risks of misunderstanding. Third, counsel should con-
duct a sufficient examination of the facts supporting the opinion to
resolve any doubts or eliminate any notice to the effect that the facts
are not as described in the opinion, and should disclaim in the
opinion any responsibility for the factual material. Fourth, counsel
should conduct sufficient legal research to support the legal conclu-
sions expressed in the opinion. Fifth, the opinion should permit
reliance by, and be directed only to, the underwriters to prevent
unintended reliance by persons not represented. The opinion should
also explicitly prohibit its reproduction in whole or in part and any
reference to it in the disclosure documents or otherwise. 25 '
The description of the role of counsel in the disclosure docu-
ments probably has value in selling the securities. Any such refer-
ence to the role of bond counsel, however, should be strictly limited
250
 See Freeman, supra note 248, at 433-39.
251
 See Black & CO. v. Nova-Tech, Inc., 333 F. Supp. 468 (D. Ore. 1971) (attorneys
could be "participants" in violations of the Oregon securities laws due to the use of their firm's
name as company counsel in the issuer's annual report). See also Adams v. American Sec.
Co., 3 CCH Blue Sky L. Rep. 11 71,072, at 67337 (Ore. 1973).
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to "passing on the validity of the issuance of the bonds and certain
tax questions on behalf of the underwriters" or "on behalf of the
company."252 No impression should be created by the language in
the disclosure documents that any activities, particularly activities
relating to the securities laws, by any counsel are for the benefit of
the investors. 253 The practice of using phrases describing the role of
counsel in general terms, such as passing "on certain legal matters,"
or "on securities matters" is unwise) Rather, a simple statement that
a firm "has acted as counsel to the underwriters [or other party] in
connection with the offering" would seem less likely to be misinter-
preted. By following these. procedures, counsel will be able to
minimize the possibility of common law liability resulting solely
from rendering opinions in connection with an offering.
F. Liability in Connection with Representations in
Letters to Auditors
Where counsel may have a relationship with the issuing com-
pany, the accountants in the transaction may request the company
to authorize counsel to disclose certain matters, including threatened
or pending litigation and contingent liabilities. However, the con-
cept of "contingent liabilities" can be extremely broad and may
include matters disclosed to counsel on a confidential basis. 254 Dis-
closure of such matters, e.g., a theoretical antitrust violation, may
not only be embarrassing to a company but also may remove the
contingent nature of the liability by providing potential claimants
with essential information. These potential claimants will be more
than willing to act when the client has made a statement against its
interests in its own disclosure documents.
In many cases, the accountants refer to the letter from the
attorneys in the notes to the financial statements. This may foster
reliance by investors upon the letter. Consequently, it is necessary
that care be taken with regard to the preparation of such a letter. It
is necessary for each counsel to make its own determinations on
subtle and difficult issues regarding responses to these inquiries. In
any case, the same degree of care should be exercised in the prepara-
tion of these letters as in the preparation of opinions. 255
252
 Id. at 944.
253 See Cooney, The Implications of the Revolution in Securities Regulation for Lawyers,
29 Bus. Law. 129, 133-34 (Special Issue, Mar. 1974).
254 See the exposure draft, Guidelines for Lawyers' Responses to Auditors' Requests for
Information, Comm. on Corporate Law and Accounting, Scope of Lawyers' Responses to
Auditors; Requests for Information, 29 Bus. Law. 1391, 1397-1400 (1974). The revised
exposure draft of the Guidelines was adopted at the Jan. 22-23, 1975 midyear meeting of the
Section's Council and Committee Chairmen, see 30 Bus. Law. 513 (1975) (rejecting ¶ 2
dealing with "deficient public disclosure").
255 See Freeman, supra note 248, at 434; Small, supra note 227, at 1210.
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G. Summary: Liability of Counsel
Present and past practices of counsel participating in exempt
offerings raise serious possibilities of liability of such counsel to the
investors or in SEC enforcement or disciplinary actions. It is rec-
ommended that counsel refuse to participate in any exempt offering
without receiving adequate assurances that the underwriter is fulfill-
ing its investigatory obligations. The underwriter's employment of
experienced securities counsel to represent it in connection with the
transaction generally should be sufficient evidence of the fulfillment
of the underwriter's obligations to satisfy the securities laws and
prevent liability of counsel, unless there is notice of the inadequacy
of the investigation.
If counsel is employed to conduct the investigation, certain
duties arise to the client to conduct it in a nonnegligent manner.
Care is necessary in rendering opinions on securities law issues, both
in limiting the scope of the opinions and in performing the proce-
dures necessary to support them. Similar care should also be taken
in responding to company requests to provide information to ac-
countants.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
The degree of participants' responsibility for the accuracy and
completeness of the information used in selling the securities in an
exempt offering has been a neglected topic. Primary emphasis has
been placed upon responsibilities in registered offerings. Meanwhile,
as a result of the impetus provided by the Commission and as a
result of greater reliance upon exempt offerings as a means of raising
capital, the issues of duties under the antifraud provisions have
gained considerable importance. Many of the recent developments
have been unforeseen and unforeseeable to practitioners.
Nevertheless, this is a time of increasing concern with protect-
ing the "public interest;" the Commission and the courts are creating
duties heretofore nonexistent under the federal securities laws.
While many underwriters and counsel oppose these trends, new or
increased duties will continue to be placed upon them. Underwriters
must accept responsibility for accurate disclosure of all material
information pertaining to an offering at a level of culpability which
may well be set at a negligence level. Counsel cannot, without
risking liability as an aider and abettor, participate in an offering
without assurances of compliance by the underwriter with its obliga-
tions or the absence of notice of violations of duties by the under-
writer. If counsel assists the underwriter in conducting an investiga-
tion and in preparing the disclosure documents, a common law duty
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to the client may exist at a negligence level and a duty to investors,
while not existing at present, may be found at a gross negligence, if
•not a negligence, level.
The emphasis has been placed upon encouraging disclosure, in
some cases without regard to the costs which must ultimately be
passed to the investors. That sweeping changes in long standing
procedures will be required is seen as a benefit, rather than a
detriment. It can only be concluded that the conduct of an exempt
offering will come to be a much more expensive and time consuming
process.
• APPENDIX A
Illustrations rf the Concept of Materiality
The compilation of examples does not purport to be exhaustive. Instead, examples were
selected on the basis of the following criteria; (1) their value in providing a broad range of
situations to reflect the numerous problems which are likely to arise; (2) their relative simplicity
and ease of adaptation to a memorandum of this nature; and (3) their exemplary value for
those concerned with these issues in the context of the preparation of adequate disclosure
documents. Many of the misrepresentations and omissions could have been prevented through
adherence by the underwriters and others to due diligence procedures. In some cases, however,
particularly those involving outright fraud by management, no degree of investigatory activity
would have uncovered the problems, Nevertheless, even those situations are useful in provid-
ing examples for thoSe who bear judgmental obligations.
The specific examples follow.
1• Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S•D.N.Y. 1968), involved an
issuer in the business of building and selling bowling alleys. The issuer publicly sold its
5-1/2% convertible subordinated debentures and soon thereafter filed a petition in bankrupt-
cy. A number of misrepresentations and omissions occurred in the registration statement for
the offering:
(a) Errors in sales and earnings. In the preparation of the financial statements, several
errors were made: (I) the treatment of buildings as fully complete, although they were only 78
to 82% complete under the "percentage of completion" accounting method; (2) the addition to
the sales price of a building of the amount of a loan made by the issuer for the benefit of the
landlord of the buyer when the additional amount was unrelated to the construction price and
there was little evidence of repayment; (3) the inclusion in sales of the proceeds of a "sale" of a
bowling alley to a factor who had leased it to a consolidated subsidiary of the issuer; and (4)
the inclusion in sales of the proceeds of a "sale" of a bowling alley annex which was actually
only leased to the "buyer." As a cumulative result of these errors, sales, profits, and earnings
per share were overstated. Id. at 656-59. The court held, however, that the misstatements
resulting from these errors were not material because the debentures were rated "B." Id. at
681-82. The court felt that an average prudent investor would view bonds with this rating as
speculative, and that actual investors had probably viewed the issuer as a growth company
and had bought the debentures for their conversion features. Under these circumstances, the
court was satisfied that investors would not have been deterred by disclosure of the correct
information. Id.
(b) Errors in the balance sheet. Two major errors occurred in the preparation of the
balance sheet, the first being an overstatement of net current assets. This was due in part to
(I) the failure to create a reserve for certain receivables which should have been treated as
uncollectible; (2) the inclusion in "trade accounts receivable" of an amount due under the lease
of a bowling alley to a subsidiary; and (3) the inclusion in current assets of factors' reserves
(amounts withheld on customer notes discounted with the factor), even though a portion of
the reserves would not be released to the issuer within a year because the maturity of the
factored notes extended beyond that time. Id. at 661-62. The second major error in the
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balance sheet was a failure to disclose certain contingent liabilities and a failure to reflect
certain direct liabilities. The prospectus stated that the issuer had guaranteed 25% of the
payments due under certain leases of facilities involving as lessor a factor who had purchased
the facilities from the issuer. The leases were (1) directly to operators of the facilities and (2) in
other cases, through subsidiaries of the issuer to other operators. Under the second type of
lease, the issuer's express guarantee actually applied to 100% of the lease payments. In
addition, another liability was reflected as "contingent" under a lease guarantee, when in fact
the facility was leased to a consolidated subsidiary so that the liability of the issuer was direct.
Direct liabilities should also have been increased by $325,000 to account for a building sold to
a subsidiary. Contingent liabilities should have totaled $1,125,795 instead of $750,000. Id. at
664-65. However, the figures actually disclosed showed a high ratio of contingent liabilities to
total assets. The court reasoned that buyers willing to purchase the debentures in the face of
this information would not have been deterred if they had been told that contingent liabilities
were even higher; it therefore held the errors to be not material. Id. at 682. The remaining
balance sheet errors were determined to be material since they caused the current ratio to be
reflected as 1.9 to 1 rather than the correct ratio of 1.6 to 1 (an overstatement of 18.8%).
According to the court, "Nhere must be some point at which errors in disclosing a company's
balance sheet position become material, even to a growth-oriented investor. Oa all the
evidence I find that these balance sheet errors were material . ." Id.
(c) Overstatement of backlog. The prospectus stated that the issuer had unfilled orders
amounting to $6,905,000. There were, however, no legally enforceable contracts for more
than half of these orders, and in at least one other case no contract could be found. In the
latter case, the alley had been completed and was operated by the issuer. Id. at 669-70. The
court held the resulting overstatement of 185.9% to be material. Id. at 681.
(d) Officers' loans. The prospectus stated that loans had been made by officers to the
issuer during the previous three years, and that all such loans had been repaid. In fact,
"repayment" of these loans had been made in the form of delivery of checks to the officers on
the condition that the checks be retained until money was deposited to cover them. Addition-
ally, after the date as of which the prospectus purported to speak, but prior to the date the
registration statement became effective, other loans were made and similarly "repaid" on a
conditional basis. The court held that the prospectus was materially misleading as to both
groups of loans because the conditional repayment was not repayment in fact and because the
prospectus, by mentioning "repayment" of the first group of loans, impliedly represented that
there were no other such loans made prior to or outstanding on the effective date. Id. at
671-72, 681.
(e) Use of proceeds. The prospectus stated that proceeds would be used for construc-
tion, development of a new equipment line, a loan to a subsidiary and additional working
capital. In fact,• the issuer was short of cash and used much of the proceeds to pay a
substantial amount of its indebtedness, including the loans to officers discussed above. After
finding that the issuer had intended to so use the money when the debentures were sold and
that the defendants had failed to establish fully that eventually other working capital had
been used for the purposes set out in the prospectus, the court held the misstatements to be
material. Id. at 673-76, 681.
(f) Dealings between issuer and factor. The prospectus stated that the issuer had been
"required to repurchase" less than 1/2 of 1% of its discounted notes. The court found that this
statement was literally true because a letter from a factor with which the issuer was having
difficulty did not include a demand for immediate repurchase. Id. at 677. But the court held
that the prospectus was "impliedly false" to a material extent on this matter because it gave
the impression that the issuer's problems concerning customer defaults were minimal when in
reality the factor was postponing the demand for immediate repurchase only because of
skillful negotiation by the issuer and knowledge of the forthcoming sale of debentures. Id. at
677-78, 681.
(g) Description of business. The prospectus stated that the issuer was "engaged in the
design, manufacture, construction, installation, modernizing and repair of bowling alleys and
the manufacture and sale of related equipment." It failed to add that, due to business failures
of customers and changes in the bowling alley market, the issuer was also engaged in the
operation of alleys. In holding this to be a material omission, id. at 681, the court said:
"Operating an alley is obviously quite a different business from constructing one, with
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different problems and different risks.... It was something that purchasers of the debentures
were entitled to know." Id. at 678.
2. Failure to correct, in connection with transactions in securities, misleading informa-
tion already in the public domain can also result in violations of the securities laws. In SEC v.
Shattuck Denn Mining Corp., 297 F. Supp. 470 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), negotiations concerning a
Material corporate acquisition had been reported as agreeably concluded. The situation
changed, however, and new terms were to be negotiated. While the acquisition that had been
reported as imminent had now become only a possibility, defendant, an insider, sold stock.
The court held that he had failed to disclose material information and enjoined future such
transactions. Id. at 476.
3. In SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en bane), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969), directors and other insiders of the issuer were enjoined from
further trading and were required to offer rescission after acquiring the issuer's securities
without disclosure of material inside information concerning extraordinary drill cores indicat-
ing the probable discovery of an extremely valuable ore body. 401 F.2d at 843.47. The
situation was aggravated by public releases by the issuer which excessively emphasized the
inconclusive nature of the results of the drilling. The court found that the information "might
well have affected the price of [the issuer's] stock and would certainly have been an important
fact to a reasonable, if speculative, investor in deciding whether he should buy, sell, or hold."
Id. at 850. See Annot,, 2 A,L.R. Fed. 190 (1969).
4. In Wechsler v. Southeastern Prop., Inc., [1972-73 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. If 93,555, at 92688 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), a motion to dismiss was overruled and a purported
class action was allowed to proceed to discovery i upon plaintiffs complaint that the issuer did
not disclose that it had been negotiating for its acquisition by another corporation. Id.
5, In Gould v, Tricon, Inc,, 272 F. Supp; 385 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), plaintiff was granted
rescission because the issuer's prospectus had failed to reveal that the issuer's president,
chairman of the board and major stockholder, began work during previous employment on a
device which constituted the issuer's major asset. Although there had been no patent infringe-
ment suit brought by the previous employer, the court concluded that, in light of the evidence
concerning assignment of rights to inventions by the officer-stockholder to his previous
employer, the plaintiff had a right to be informed of the possibility of such litigation. Id. at
391. In addition, representations in the prospectus went beyond mere "puffing" into the area
of material misrepresentations when the design and development of the device was incorrectly
described as complete. Id. at 392.
6. In Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544 (E.D.N. Y. 1971),
defendant wished to acquire an insurance company so that a holding company could be
formed to take advantage of the insurance company's "surplus surplus" (surplus in excess of
the amount required by the applicable state insurance laws to be kept on reserve by insurance
companies for the protection of the policy holders). In its prospectus for the exchange offer,
defendant disclosed its intention to form the holding company to utilize the acquired com-
pany's assets, but there was no disclosure of the amount or the importance of the "surplus
surplus." Defendant argued that the disclosure could not have been made at the time of the
offer because the amount of "surplus surplus" was impossible to estimate accurately. But the
court ruled that a range of estimates which had been obtained from different sources could
have been released, and the importance to the acquisition of the "surplus surplus" could have
been disclosed. Id. at 574-75. The prospectus was thus held to be materially misleading. Id. at
575. Even though estimates of the "surplus surplus" could have been obtained by investors
from other sources, the court felt that "non-insurance oriented, albeit professional investment
advisors" could not be expected to remember reports which they had seen a year earlier and
that the investors were entitled to the disclosure. Id.
7. Although disclosure had been made in the offering circular, the Commission in Del
Canso!. Indus. Inc., SEC Securities Act Release No. 4795, reprinted in [1964-66 Transfer
Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 77,267, at 82404 (July 26, 1965), found an offering circular
to be materially misleading because of its manner of presentation of the information. In the
"Business and Property" section, the issuer explained that its options to purchase "working
interests" in four proven oil leases averaged only 33 741% of all oil and gas produced therefrom
instead of the customary 871/2%. But the introductory statement merely stated that the issuer
had the option to purchase the working interests without disclosure of the reduced percentage.
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The Commission held that the introductory statement violated § 17 of the Securities Act, 15
U.S.C. § 77q (1970), id. at 82405, explaining:
Even though an offering circular contains all the essential facts, it still may not
satisfy the disclosure requirements if the facts are not presented so clearly that they
will be plainly evident to the ordinary investor. . . The burden should not be
placed on the investor to examine the offering circular for qualifying language to
counteract the misleading nature of a statement in its introductory material . . . .
Id. at- 82406.
8. In Hill York Corp. v. American Int'l Franchises, Inc., 448 F.2d 680 (5th Cir. 1971),
promoters were held liable in connection with sale of stock of franchise sales centers. Id. at
695. Material misrepresentations and omissions were made as follows: (1) the firm which the
promoters had recently left had been described as "very successful," although the firm was in
fact under investigation by the Commission; (2) the cast of rights to the franchise sales centers,
which were purchased from an affiliated corporation, included a lump sum payment of
$25,000, which had been disclosed, but also included a monthly payment of $1,000, which
had not been disclosed; (3) one of the promoters advising the franchisees was not an expert in
capitalization consulting as he had been represented to be; and (4) the promoters' operations in
other states had been described as successful, although they were in fact under investigation
by various state securities commissioners. The court held that availability of the full and
accurate information from other sources did not excuse misleading or incomplete statements in
the disclosure documents used in connection with the offering. Id. at 696.
9. In SEC v. R.A. Holman & Co., 366 F.2d 456 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
991 (1967), defendant, a registered dealer, was permanently enjoined from committing further
securities law violations for, among other things, informing the investor of a price rise in the
stock during two previous annual industry exhibitions in which the issuer had participated,
without disclosing that the price had dropped before the end of the exhibitions. 366 F.2d at
458. The court found that this was an omission to state a material fact necessary to make the
statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading.
Id. at 458-59. Therefore, even though there had been no initial duty to disclose this decrease,
its disclosure became necessary after disclosure of the increase. The lower court's finding of a
material misrepresentation in the dealer's failure to disclose that it had originally purchased
the securities for investment and not for resale was reversed on appeal. Id. at 457.
10. In Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972), defendants were
held liable under Rule 10b-5 for failure to disclose to plaintiffs that, in purchasing plaintiffs'
stock, the defendants (transfer agents for the stock) were not only acting as market makers but
had already found a buyer for a higher price than defendants were paying to plaintiffs. Id. at
152-53.
11. In Mutual Fund Distribs., Inc., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6862
reprinted in 11961-64 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
	 76,859, at 81190 (July 25,
1962), the Commission revoked the registrations of broker-dealers who were found to have
made materially misleading statements when, in selling shares of an investment company,
they used a prospectus which stated that the issuer's investment policy would result in a
"normal turnover in securities held" without disclosing that the "normal turnover" was
defined in terms of the issuer's experience rather than in terms of industrywide experience. Id.
at 81192. Also found to be material was the failure to disclose that two individuals generally
directed the affairs of the issuer independently of the board of directors. Id.
12. In Hafner v. Forest Labs. Inc., 345 F.2d 167 (2d Cir. 1965), a holder of restricted
securities exercised an option requiring the issuer to repurchase shares and later sued the
issuer for rescission and damages, alleging that the issuer had violated Rule 10b-5 by failing to
disclose a forthcoming 4% stock dividend. The circuit court affirmed the trial court's decision
that this information as a matter of law was immaterial, but used a different rationale. While
the lower court reasoned that stock dividends have no intrinsic value, the appellate court
recognized that in some instances the market may place a value on them. The appellate court
found this nondisclosure immaterial, however, because the issuer had not initiated or
negotiated the repurchase. Instead, the plaintiff had initiated the transaction and the issuer
had merely accepted the option request. Id. at 168.
13. Robinette & Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7386, reprinted in
(1964-66 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
	 77,118, at 82057 (Aug. 11, 1964),
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involved misrepresentations by a broker-dealer in the sale of convertible debentures. The
Commission implied that one of the facts which should have been disclosed concerning the
issuer was that its management was continually troubled by internal friction. Id. at 82058-59.
14. In SEC v. Bennett & Co., 207 F. Supp. 919 (D.N.J. 1962), an underwriter was
enjoined from further sale of stock in a construction loan business after the court found,
among other things, that the offering circular and other disclosures used in connection with
past sales had failed to mention that a salesman who was employed by the underwriter was
also an officer, director, promoter and principal shareholder of the issuer; that the shares
being offered had no voting rights; that the issuer had not yet established permanent offices;
and that the issuer had as yet no operating history. Id. at 922-24.
15. Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808 (D. Del. 1951), aff'd, 235 F.2d 369
(3d Cir. 1956), involved purchases by the defendant of securities of an issuer in which
defendant was already a controlling stockholder. The purchases were made without disclo-
sure: (1) that the value of the issuer's inventory had appreciated to a much higher level than
that reflected on the balance sheet in the issuer's most recent annual report; or (2) that
defendant intended to liquidate the issuer after purchasing the stock, thus obtaining for itself
the benefit of the increased inventory value. The omissions were treated as material. 99 F.
Supp. at 828- 29.
16. In SEC Securities Act Release No. 5449, reprinted in 4 CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
11 72,173, at 62390 (Jan. 3, 1974) ("Disclosure of Inventory Profits Reflected in Income in
Periods of Rising Prices"), the effects of changing economic trends are discussed as matters
which must be taken into account in making materiality judgments. In the release, the
Commission recognized that during a period of rapidly rising prices the profits of many
companies are artificially high because of the inclusion therein of "inventory profit." Id. This is
a profit resulting from a rise in prices on inventory items between the time of purchase of the
inventory and the time of sale. This "profit" may be reflected as inflated earnings in the
current year's financial statement; however, this earnings level may never be repeated because
the increased inventory costs will affect the succeeding year's earnings. While declining to
prescribe new accounting methods or formal requirements for disclosure to deal with this
problem, the Commission urged disclosure of such amounts when they reach material levels,
after describing these profits as "potentially unrepeatable" and as profits which "do not reflect
an increase in the economic earning power of the business." Id. at 62390-91.
It is impossible to predict with certainty whether information similar to that in the
situations discussed above would consistently be held to be material, Because each fact
situation is unique, and because some of the examples are judicially untested positions of the
Commission, judgmental determinations on materiality issues must be made independently.
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